Kurniawan, Budi (2022) Review: Robert Keohane (1984), “A Functional Theory of Regimes” in After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 6. [Teaching Resource] (Unpublished)

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Abstract

In this article, Keohane argues that international regimes can solve the problem of political market failure in international politics. Using the Coase Theorem analogy, which has frequently been used to demonstrate the effectiveness of bargaining without central authority (or government interventions in economic term), Keohane contends that it can also be applied in international relations (p.86). According to him, international regimes can establish patterns of legal liability, provide roughly symmetrical information, and arrange the costs of negotiation such that specific agreements can be reached more easily.

Item Type:	Teaching Resource
Subjects:	J Political Science > JZ International relations
Divisions:	Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik (FISIP) > Prodi Hubungan Internasional
Depositing User:	Budi Kurniawan
Date Deposited:	18 Oct 2022 01:53
Last Modified:	18 Oct 2022 01:53
URI:	http://repository.lppm.unila.ac.id/id/eprint/45757

Available Versions of this Item

• Review: Robert Keohane (1984), “A Functional Theory of Regimes” in After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 6. (deposited 14 Oct 2022 01:20)
  • Review: Robert Keohane (1984), “A Functional Theory of Regimes” in After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 6. (deposited 18 Oct 2022 01:53) [Currently Displayed]

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