
## LIBERAL FOREIGN POLICY THEORY: IDEATIONAL LIBERALISM<sup>1</sup>

Based on what shapes the states preferences, liberal theory is divided into 3 variants (Moravcsik, 1997; 2001; 2010):

- (1) Ideational liberalism: state preferences based on domestic social value and identities,
- (2) commercial liberalism: state preferences based on the economic interests, and
- (3) Republican liberalism: state preferences based on systems of domestic representation.

Ideational Liberalism Framework (Luerdi, 2019)



Ideational Liberalism (Moravcsik, 1997; 2001; 2010):

- Domestic societal identities and values are basic determinants of state preferences.
- Social values as the set of preferences held by various individuals and groups in society concerning the proper scope and nature legitimate state objectives.
- Social actors both individuals and groups, also called social coalition, have their views about nation, political ideology and socioeconomic regulation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Bahan diskusi perkuliahan Teori Ilmu Hubungan Internasional Universitas Abdurrab, 2020.

- These views then transferred into conceptions of what legitimate domestic order such as national border, political institution, socioeconomic regulation and redistribution.
- Foreign policy is an effort to realize these views domestically.
- Social actors provide support to the government in exchange for institutions that accord with their identity-based preferences and therefore deemed legitimate.
- The effect of conceptions of social legitimacy on state behavior depends on patterns of interdependence among these ideals in other words, on the transnational externalities created for others by attempts to realize those preferences into one place.
- What is externality? Costs and benefits of a preference pursuit through interaction with others.
- Where national conceptions of legitimate borders, political institutions and socioeconomic equality are compatible, generating positive or negligible externalities, peaceful coexistence is likely. Where social identities are incompatible and create significant negative externalities as when one state views the promotion of its legitimate border, political institutions and socioeconomic standards as requiring aggression or demands visà-vis another state tension and zero-sum conflict is more likely.
- Social actors don't always shape new legitimate social order and preferences for the state,
   but support the existing legitimate social order and preferences. However, such legitimate
   order and preferences match their views or preferences.
- There are 3 kinds of identities according to domestic social actors that shape legitimate state order or support the existing state order:
  - (1) national identity. One basic type of social identity concerns the scope of the nation: specifically, the legitimate location of national borders and the allocation of citizenship rights. Societal actors have a particular view about a nation along with its border and will keep trying to bring it as a legitimate concept for the state. Where borders coincide with underlying patterns of identity, coexistence and even mutual recognition are more likely, but where there are inconsistencies between borders and underlying patterns of identity greater potential for interstate conflict exists;
  - (2) political ideology. The second basic type of social identity stems from individuals and group commitments to particular forms of political institutions. The social

- actors may be in favor of values of particular ideology such as democracy, political liberalism, authoritarian regime or other political ideologies. Where the realization of legitimate domestic political institutions in one jurisdiction threatens its realization in others (negative externalities), conflict is more likely. For example, when the United States and the Soviet Union were motivated by divergent political ideologies, disputes over political ideology have fueled international conflict;
- (3) socioeconomic regulation. The third basic type of social identity relevant for world politics stems from beliefs about legitimate socioeconomic regulation and redistribution. Social actors may be in favor of particular economic type and policy such liberal economy or protectionism. Modern liberal theories have long recognized that societal preferences concerning the appropriate nature and level of regulation impose legitimate limits on transnational markets. Domestic and international markets are embedded in local social compromises concerning the provision of regulatory public goods. The extent to which countries can cooperate to liberalize markets, for example, depends on the level of conflict or convergence of views about immigration, social welfare, taxation, religious freedom, families, health and safety, environmental and consumer protection, cultural promotion, and many other domestic public goods.
- Such identities define national preferences of a state which are actually encouraged by social actors within the state. Since preferences are seen as goals the state wants to achieve, so state preferences are basically state interests which are also shaped or supported and maintained by social actors trough legitimate social order (also called legitimate state order).

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