



## **The Future of Indonesian Patronage Democracy: Political Campaign Financing Reform**

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### **Abstract**

This study aims to see the relationship between patterns of patronage, clientelism, money politics, and campaign financing within the framework of patronage democracy that occurs in Indonesia. This paper uses the literature review method, the use of this method is related to the practice of patronage democracy and campaign financing which limits researchers in data collection. Data collection is done by collecting various books, scientific articles or journals related to the problem and research objectives. The results of this paper describe the pattern of patronage causing the large campaign costs incurred by each party and the candidate it nominates. The amount of money spent on campaigns can lead to acts of corruption. The solution offered in this paper has two points. First, campaign funding is financed 100% by the state, meaning that no other source of funds is allowed to enter the party. Thus, parties and candidates do not need to look for other sources of funds, so as to avoid the political potential of the party's debt of gratitude to fund owners from outside the party. Second, utilizing social media by conducting campaigns through social media because social media provides an open space with available features. Campaigns using social media can also minimize the expenditure of funds disbursed by the candidates. Thus, efforts to carry out money politics or vote buying will be reduced.

**Keywords:** Patronage Democracy; Buying and Selling Voices; Corruption; Campaign Funding

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## INTRODUCTION

Democracy is a term that is most commonly heard in various parts of the world, especially for countries whose society really wants a government that really listens to the will of its people. In the Bangkok conference in 1965, the International Commission of Jurist expanded the concept of the Rule of Law. At the conference it was discussed that the basic conditions for the implementation of a democratic government under the Rule of Law include a) constitutional protection, b) the judiciary is free and impartial, c) general elections, d) freedom to express opinions, e) freedom of association and opposition, and f) Citizenship education. It is clearly explained here that elections are basic requirements for the administration of a democratic government. Elections are the main mechanism and premise of representative democracy. Election as a way to elect representatives of the people who will represent the people in the representative body. To achieve this goal, holding elections must reflect democratic values (Santoso & Budhiati, 2019).

Talking about general elections cannot be separated from campaign activities. Campaigns and elections are like "two sides of a coin" that cannot be separated from each other. Campaign is a doctrinal act aimed at gaining support (Nur, 2019). Political campaigns are interpreted as activities to persuade voters that aim to increase electability and popularity, so a candidate needs to have a careful strategy and planning. The candidates who take part in the election certainly have a different way of campaigning from other candidates. Campaigns which are a means to achieve political ideals require strategies and funds to win elections as well as the ideals desired by legislative candidates and supporting parties (Fatimah, 2018).

Funding in elections will greatly determine the integrity of election administrators. In addition, money in elections is also closely related to the principles of electoral justice, especially the principle of equality in the campaign process. One important aspect of money in elections is campaign funds (Sukmajati & Disyacitta, 2019). Excessive campaign costs are one of the factors causing money politics and the strengthening of the patron-client culture and vote buying in all campaign activities. This act of vote buying

causes the cost of the campaign to end up being more expensive, increasing the cost to be higher (Bryan & Baer, 2005). The practice of patronage played by candidates in campaigning has become very common and takes place at every level of the general election (Sholikin, 2019). The narrowest definition of political finance is money used to finance elections or campaigns. Money can be collected and used by candidates for public office, political parties from other individuals and support groups. Political parties play an important role in campaigning, so it is difficult to distinguish between the costs of a campaign run by a party and the costs of day-to-day operations. Therefore, it makes sense to classify party funding as political funding as well (Sahroni et al., 2019).

The practices of money politics in every general election have found various forms and are packaged so neatly and massively in mobilizing electoral support. The form of money politics is not only in the form of buying votes with money, but also in the form of patronage goods such as the provision of free health and education services to the politicization of appreciation funds. In this condition, the discourse on the work program and party ideology is not seen as strong as a campaign instrument in boosting electoral support. In this context, the author mentions that democracy (elections) that take place in Indonesia is a type of patronage democracy. Democracy here is defined as competition in the election of public officials (legislative or executive) through general elections. According to Chandra (2004), patronage democracy is a democracy where electoral mobilization is based on clientelism. Meanwhile, the study of Aspinall & Berenschot (2019) has linked the oligarchic character of the regime with the clientelistic nature of election campaigns in Indonesia.

Meanwhile, "patronage democracy" occurs when the process of selecting public officials in elections is dominated by transactions and/or exchange of goods (patronage goods) using either public goods (public goods) or private goods (personal) between politicians (candidates) and the public (voters). ), rather than proposing party ideology or work packages to mobilize electoral support for victory (Mahsun, 2020).

Many studies that discuss campaign financing such as research (Sukmajati & Disyacitta, 2019) explain campaign financing and election financing in 2019 are considered as strengthening clientelism. Sukmajati also assessed that Indonesia's democracy in the future will lead to the strengthening of patronage democracy marked by the existence of political links between political actors and voters based on material incentives (money or goods). Another study from Taniady (2021) suggests that Indonesia does not yet have a comprehensive policy of limiting campaign funds, this gal encourages corruption and undermines the democratic order in Indonesia. Judging from the absence of clear regulations regarding the use of personal funds and political parties in campaigns. Similar research on patronage democracy in other elections from Mahsun (2020), Mahsun explained that candidates in mobilizing electoral support prefer to use the issue of money politics rather than the ideological instruments of their political parties. This form of money politics works in a network of political clientelism that is built between candidates, brokers, and voters through ties of character, kinship, and friendship. The focus of this paper differs from previous research, this paper focuses on how the relationship between the patterns of clientelism, patronage, money politics, and campaign financing within the framework of patronage democracy that occurs in Indonesia, as well as what solutions are used to reduce the practice of money politics and vote buying. shaded by patronage democracy.

## **RESEARCH METHOD**

This paper uses the literature review method, the use of this method is related to the practice of patronage democracy and campaign financing which limits researchers in data collection. This literature review study is a research conducted by researchers by collecting various books, scientific articles or journals related to the problem and research objectives. Literature research or literature review is library data obtained from various sources of library information, relating to research topics such as journals, books, abstracts of research results, and others (Sugiyono, 2019). The literature review data collection was carried out in several stages including searching for articles based on topics

and problems and comparing related data. data collection using the Google Scholar portal with the keywords "Patronage Democracy, Clintelism, Corruption, Campaign Funding". The next stage, the article is analyzed regarding the relationship of the article to the research topic, then the author compares if there are books or journals that are related to each other. The purpose of adding journals and other literature is to strengthen arguments and add quality and relevant study material.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### ***Klientelisme, Patronase, and Money Politic in a Campaign***

According to Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007) clientelism is the direct exchange of citizens' voices in exchange for direct payments or continued access to jobs, goods and services. According to Hicken (2011) referring to Scott, clientelism has several characteristics, namely, first, a two-party relationship (dyadic relationship), in which two parties (candidates and voters) develop direct, face-to-face and transactional relationships. Second, a two-way relationship (contingency), in which the patron (candidate) and client (voters) give and take each other. The third is the hierarchy, where the patron (candidate) has a higher position than the wali (voters). Fourth is iteration, which is the relationship between the two continuously over a long period of time.

The concept of clientelism is often placed in a different position from patronage. The concept of patronage is defined as a two-way relationship in which a person with a higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his influence and resources to provide protection to another person of a lower socioeconomic status (the client), who offers support and assistance. In line with Shefter's view that patronage is profit sharing among politicians to distribute something individually to voters, workers or campaigners, in order to get political support from them (Shefter, 1994). Although between patronage and clientelism can be distinguished, but in practice both have a close and strong attachment. Aspinal explained that clientelism usually has a close relationship with patronage, but in some conditions not all patronage can be distributed in a clientelistic relationship because clientelism is no longer considered an accurate

way to gain political votes without patronage ties (Aspinal & Sukmajati, 2015).


Overall, the practice of democracy in Indonesia is still characterized by a patron-client relationship and a patronage model. One of the factors that causes the growth of patronage and patterns of patronage relationships in the democratic process in Indonesia is the underdeveloped moral public sphere which is the heart of democracy. A healthy democracy requires a public sphere filled with a strong civil society that actively controls the management of power. Power that is not controlled by the main civil society will lead to arbitrariness (Madung, 2016).

Incidents of money politics are getting more massive near the election. Voter survey data confirms the escalation of money politics ahead of the election D-Day. The author's national survey in January 2014 showed that only 4.3% of voters admitted to being offered bribes, then increased to 8.1% in February 2014 and 10.7 percent in March 2014. The proportion of respondents who claimed to be targeted by money politics rose sharply to 33% in April 2014. The results of the 2014 post-Pileg survey in April 2014 showed that the most bribers gave goods in the form of money (75.5%), followed by basic necessities (12.8%) and household utensils (11.4%). Although almost all political parties or legislative candidates practice this bribery practice, when asked which political party or the times of the candidates for the political party gave bribes, the four largest political parties that practice money politics the most are nationalist political parties. 32.2% of respondents targeted for money politics mentioned Golkar, 26.5% said PDI-P, 25% said they were from the Gerindra Party, and 18.4% said they received compensation from the Democratic Party. There are at least three variations that determine the amount of money exchanged. First, variations between regions. Voters in Java are generally "cheaper" in price than voters outside Java. This is related to the population of voters in Java which is denser and the geography is more affordable, so that legislative candidates do not have to spend too much on logistics costs. Equally important is the moral economy of money politics which makes this

practice, for the Javanese, not seen solely as an exchange of commodities (votes) for money, but as a reciprocal cultural practice: because legislative candidates need voter support, candidates must understand give perfunctory rewards as a sign of gratitude (gift-giving). The second variation is that the "price" of rural residents is generally more affordable than urban voters. Lastly is the variation between candidates. Many legislative candidates who have high "nutrition" issue more envelopes and are larger than the "market price" of voters prevailing in an area (Muhtadi, 2018).

Patronage in campaigns occurs when candidates provide monetary rewards in the hope that the public is willing to vote for them. This phenomenon is called vote buying and selling. The problem of the practice of buying and selling votes is no longer considered illegal, because it will continue to occur without strict supervision. Although there are criminal sanctions and administrative penalties in the form of being canceled as a candidate candidate. This problem is most likely caused by several economic factors that greatly affect the political choices of voters. Takeuchi (2013) explains the reasons why vote buying and selling occurs. (1) the strategy of the candidates to win the election, (2) the probability of victory is getting bigger, (3) there is corruption committed by incumbents in the election, (4) the target of the campaign is people with middle to lower (poor) economy, (5) bidding political rewards with active participation.

Vote buying is an advantage for people who have a relatively low economy and quality of human resources, causing people to not think long about refusing the money. In fact, the effect of vote buying is prolonged, because the poor will continue to be poor without any changes made by the elected candidate. The candidate will only be busy thinking about how the capital when campaigning will return (Andhika, 2017). Vote buying and selling does not only occur in Indonesia, Indonesia ranks 3rd in the highest vote buying and selling cases in Asia, it can be seen in graph 1.




Picture 1. The Practice of Selling and Buying Election Votes in Asia: Indonesia is the Highest  
 Source : (Databoks.katadata.co.id, 2020)

Based on Picture 1, in summary, elections are often associated with buying and selling votes for candidate leaders. Not only in Indonesia, this is also common in many parts of Asia. Nearly one in seven accepted an offer to sell the voting rights. The agreement applies to elections at the local, regional and national levels. Thailand and the Philippines are the two countries with the highest ticket purchase rates. As many as 28% of respondents admitted to taking bribes to sell their voting rights. Indonesia is also not spared from this phenomenon, accounting for 26% of respondents. Overall, 55% of respondents to the Transparency International report

believe that government is run by vested interests. Transparency International conducted a survey that recruited nearly 20,000 people aged 18 and over. Data collection from March 2019 to September 2020 covered 17 countries in Asia.

Regarding the acceptance of bribes, the findings of a research survey on the size of envelopes given to legislative candidates were carried out in four provinces including West Sumatra, North Sulawesi, Central Java, and East Java by Muhtadi (2018). As can be seen in graph 2.



Picture 2: The amount of money disbursed by Timses per voter (%)  
Source: (Muhtadi, 2018)

Based on Picture 2, it clearly illustrates that the contents of the envelopes distributed by the Timses who work for the DPRD candidates at the provincial level are usually smaller (on average on the basis of Rp. 25 thousand per voter) than the Timses of the Regency/City DPRD. This is because the provincial-level candidates need more votes to pass than the district/city-level candidates. Even though the price per envelope is lower, due to the large amount of support that must be collected to be elected, the total expenditure for DPR RI candidates is still much higher than the candidates at the legislative level. province or district/city. An elected candidate from an Islamic party admitted that in the 2014 Pileg, he launched a package of 450 thousand envelopes containing between Rp. 10 thousand to Rp. 20 thousand per envelope (Interview, 20 April 2014). If the average per envelope is Rp. 15 thousand, it means that he must disburse a minimum of Rp. 6,750,000. 000 is just for money politics surgery. This does not include the envelope that he must present for tandem work with the provincial or district/city DPRD candidates plus logistics and distribution costs (Muhtadi, 2018).

In the context of money politics, Winters understands how Indonesian citizens ultimately focus on the only thing that is more concrete, namely direct material rewards. This is done to override things like track records and campaign promises. Broadly speaking, voters have learned that the visions and missions of future political officials are often just gibberish without much execution (Winters, 2016). Clientelism becomes a phenomenon that can be analyzed more contextually. Especially in relation to corrupt

behavior in a distorting democracy (Ramadhan & Oley, 2019). Corruption is considered a patronage system, meaning that public officials are not only for the public interest, but also for the interests of those in power who place them in certain positions of power. For example, ministers from political parties will be more loyal to the party than to the president or the people, even though they are assistants to the president and are directly under the president's power in a presidential system of government like Indonesia. Patronage is a form of corruption with a very broad impact, because it occurs systematically and penetrates into the deepest layers of society (Madung, 2016).

The large sums of money spent on campaigns can lead to the collection and return of election funds from corrupt proceeds such as trade licensing, policy bribes, buying and selling positions all carried out by regional heads to collect and return election funds. This funding is needed to finance the five processes that are usually passed by legislative candidates in elections and spend considerable amounts of legal and illegal funds, namely the candidate nomination process, internal party selection, campaigning, vote counting, and dispute resolution processes. The first process is the pre-nomination (para) of candidates trying to promote themselves to the public and political parties to be nominated as candidates for regional heads. In the process, candidates generally need money to make and install props to promote themselves, such as in the form of billboards, holding populist events, or even conducting surveys (Paskarina, 2018). The existence of corruption in collecting or returning election funds has made the KPK

appeal to candidates not to get involved in money politics. The reason is, the influence of money politics in elections can be the forerunner of corruption in society. Reading the pattern of corruption it faces, the KPK agrees with the argument that political corruption stems from political corruption and high-cost elections. In line with that, Indonesia Corruption Watch (2018) mentions money politics, especially the politics of dowry and vote buying, as the cause of the high cost of electoral competition. The root of the two violations lies in the source of the main problem, namely the selection of candidate pairs of candidates by political parties (Ghaliya & Sjafrina, 2019).

Funding requirements are also required when a candidate gains party support during the nomination or selection stage within the party. Political parties have never acknowledged the existence of internal nomination fees, but the issue of political dowry is widely circulated in the community. Several cases that were widely circulated, one of which was the statement by La Nyalla Mataliti, who claimed to be asked for Rp. 170 billion in funds to get support from political parties in the regions in the 2018 East Java gubernatorial election. Politics needs to be the focus of handling cases of political corruption. The next corruption-prone stage is the campaign period, candidates need to prepare significant resources for self-socialization and the success of their program. At that stage and on polling day, cases of buying and selling votes were common. In the voting stage, the costs that need to be prepared by the parties or candidates are the costs of witnesses to cast, count and guard the ballots. Witnesses were present at every polling station sent to political parties, so the relevant parties asked the candidates for assistance to finance witnesses because political parties did not have adequate sources of funds. If the outcome of the decision is disputed, the need for funds will increase. Candidates and parties need to prepare resources to oversee the dispute resolution process (Paskarina, 2018).

Enforcement of threats and sanctions for political parties receiving transaction money. The Election Law does not regulate criminal sanctions for acts of political dowry. The only sanction that can be imposed is only an administrative sanction in the form of a

ban on submitting or nominating for the next term of office. Unfortunately, the sanctions only apply to political parties that accept politics. this is stated in Article 228 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Election Law

### **The State As The Main Source Of Campaign Funds**

According to PKPU No. 5 of 2017 article 1 paragraph 9 that campaign funds are a number of costs in the form of money, goods, or services intended for pairs of candidates and/or political parties or coalitions of political parties that propose pairs of candidates to finance campaign activities. The purpose of making campaign finance regulations is to

- a) ensure the creation of a healthy, honest and fair electoral contest
- b) preventing the pragmatic considerations of voters in making political choices
- c) ensure equal opportunity for election participants to contest and provide opportunities for voters to choose a variety of options in the election
- d) ensure that the policies made are truly for the benefit of the people and prevent the policies made by the elected candidates from being driven by donors of campaign funds
- e) Ensuring the best candidate, even though the candidate does not have a lot of funds in the election campaign

The amount of campaign funding and being a very vital thing in the campaign process encourages candidates to need funding sources. Although money is called the fuel of the political party machine. However, political parties must be smart in sorting out which fuel is good for running political parties in elections. The reason is that the elected candidate is largely determined by the source of the political funds, whether the funds are dirty or clean. The more elected candidates use dirty campaign funding sources, the elite will be held hostage when in power. On the other hand, the cleaner campaign funds come from, the freer and freer they will be from the tyranny of the owners of political capital. Therefore, a very crucial thing in campaign finance is the origin of political funding sources.

The option of transferring campaign funds to the government with a 100 percent

subsidy requires that all party use be financed by the state. No other sources of money are allowed to enter the party, including gifts from individuals, executives and administrators of the parties concerned. Political candidates who are capable, honest and willing to work hard do not have to spend a lot of money to be appointed or fund their campaigns. They only need their knowledge, experience, and sincere efforts to work on government assistance for the welfare of the people and focus on the substance and guarantee of their projects. In order to create funding for the party 100 percent of the state, the state must be able to estimate the appropriate expenditure for the party. Expenditures that are considered appropriate and appropriate are considered transparent. The government then issues assistance according to the amount of the expenditure. assistance provided in the form of cash, goods, and facilities, as well as meeting rooms and other buildings. In addition, it can be done by attaching proof of expenditure or other methods that are considered effective, such as direct billing from outside parties to the state. Assistance provided by the state to parties is used to finance party operations as well as campaign funds for candidates promoted by parties. Before receiving aid from the state, parties must submit a Draft Budget (RAB) at the beginning of the year. Apart from spending and financing by the state, the parties and candidates who are nominated are not allowed to make purchases and others (Faisal et al., 2018).

By placing the state as the main source of funds, parties and candidates do not need to look for other sources of funds, so as to avoid the political potential of the party's debt of gratitude to fund owners from outside the party. It is feared that the existence of the owner of the funds will affect the independence of the party. The drawback of the state's involvement in financing the party is that the party has the potential to become a cartel party, that is, becoming a party loses its critical character, because the party will always support government policies. In addition, if the supervision of limiting party expenditures is not effective, the state will be greatly disadvantaged because the benefits are not achieved even though the state has already disbursed very large funds. There are

several conditions for obtaining profits by doing several things, including: (1) parties must have qualified financial personnel and are able to make financial reports professionally, (2) there are limits in party expenditures so that funds from the government are sufficient, parties must be able to regulate expenditures so that political costs do not remain high (3) use the type of audit that in-depth, although now the audit has not been able to ensure the fairness of funding management and has not been able to carry out investigations if there are indications of violations (4) it is not allowed to have personal accounts for both candidates, and all campaign costs must use one party account (Faisal et al., 2018).

### **Transformation of Patronage Democracy into Digital Democracy**

In the era of the Industrial Revolution 4.0, the development of communication technology continues to increase. Today, the internet network has become an integral part of the social infrastructure, not only in the business world, but also in everyday life. As people need to use their smartphones to connect to government information and services, entertain content, and communicate with each other, the need for Internet access anytime, anywhere, is also increasing.

The number of internet users is increasing. From 2020 to the second quarter, the number of internet users reached 196.7 million or 73.7 of the total population (Jatmiko, 2020). Based on the results of the We are Hootsuite social survey, as of January 2019, Indonesia has 150 million social media users, or a total population of 56,000. Gadget social media users reach 130 million or about 48% of the population (Databoks.katadata.co.id, 2019). The social media trends that Sensor Tower publish, develop and share widely are TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat and Likee. In Indonesia alone, the penetration of social media users continues to increase to 59% of the total Indonesian population of 272.1 million people (Moedia, 2020). As of January 2021, social media users in Indonesia exceeded 170 million, or about 61.8% of Indonesia's total population (Suryawati, 2021), according to data from We Are Social




and Hootsuite. In Indonesia the number reaches 191 million (dataindonesia.id, 2022).



Picture 3. Data on Internet and Social Media Usage in Indonesia  
Source: (We Are Social, 2022)

Based on Figure 3, Total Population (total population): 277.7 million (in 2021: 274.9 million/up 1%). Connected Mobile Devices: 370.1 million (2021: 345.3 million/up 3.6%). Internet users: 204.7 million (2021: 202.6 million/up 1%). Active Social Media Users: 191.4 million (2021: 170 million, up 12.6%).



Picture 4. Percentage of Internet Users Using Each Survey-Based Social Media Platform  
Source: (We Are Social, 2022)

Based on Figures 3 and 4, Indonesian Whatsapp users in Indonesia are 88.7% of the total population, the previous year 87.7% (up). Instagram users in Indonesia are 84.8% of the total population, the previous year 86.6% (down). Facebook users in Indonesia are 81.3% of the total population, the previous year was 85.5% (down). Tiktok users in Indonesia are 63.1% of the total population, the previous year 38.7% (up rapidly). In addition, from the pictures above, it can be concluded that the Indonesian people have used the internet a lot as a source of information and communication.

The significant increase in internet users who are dominated by the use of social media shows that people are increasingly media literate or more often referred to as digital literacy. As a result, political groups and political parties in Indonesia quickly realized the potential of this social networking site as a communication channel for political tools and purposes. The use of social media for political purposes was the most astonishing of Barack Obama in the 2008 US presidential election. What Obama did was the audience, especially the people (Dalton, 2009) and (Nagourney, 2008). Obama and his political opponent, Mitt Romney, actively promote and share election-related information, primarily using the social media platforms Facebook and Twitter. Politicians and political groups in other countries have joined their supporters and the general public as Americans started using these websites for political information and to share their political views online. Begin to use it to organize and communicate (Smith, 2011).

Several studies have shown that political actors around the world use social media to build relationships with voters, form political communication, and interact directly with the general public (Anshari, 2013). Susanto (2017) argues that the political communication network formed by the use of social media is a practical reason to promote participation, contribution, feedback, openness, and the lack of distance between news sources and capabilities. The audience encourages discussion. In fact, political actors take advantage of the power of social media to increase public trust in social media and build an image in public or through personal branding. Political actors have made social media an ideal way to communicate with the general public. For example, understanding what people want and influence, invite, influence and inform the general public through content shared on social media. This communication is called Political Communication (Anshori, 2018) in (Rahmah, 2021). In line with Juniarti et al., (2019) shows that politicians use Instagram posts to implement campaign strategies to create positive impressions and ideas on social media.

The campaign which was originally carried out in a conventional and simple

manner with a lot of preparation starting from the space, structuring the implementer. Currently, with the improvement of information technology campaigns do not need to be done with difficulty because social media has provided an open space and implementation procedures by utilizing the available features and platforms. Regarding operational costs, campaigns using social media can also minimize the expenditure of funds disbursed by candidates. Because campaigns using social media only have quota capital and an adequate internet network. Campaigns via social media are not only cheap, but also honest so that they can minimize the practice of money politics during campaign implementation. Because the candidates do not go directly to the voters. Even more economical, if social media as a campaign instrument is linked to various platforms using only one account, then the distribution will spread more quickly and evenly and be accepted by voters simultaneously.

Some Internet features such as convergent, cost-effective, have resistance to control and censorship efforts. In line with the opinion of Lim (2003) said that the Internet is a friendly medium (convivial medium). So the Internet offers an unlimited space for freedom, independence and creativity compared to earlier media. Therefore, it can be seen that the position of the Internet is considered quite significant for political dynamics in Indonesia, especially in building a democratic atmosphere that continues to be good. Space that is not insulated, easy and cheap access is an advantage for the Internet compared to mainstream media such as radio, news messages, and television. Moreover, some media observers also say that the Internet is considered a new public space that is flexible and completely free from dominant power (Fatah & Fatanti, 2019)

By looking at infographics, the Internet is part of the daily life of Indonesians. Netizens, as well as what netizens usually say, feel that the communication channel that is free from economic domination and authority is the Internet and social media. The internet can generate new forms of participation in social life, such as urging a more enlightening exchange of ideas, changing political debates, carrying out social-social changes, and

reforming the political system (Kamarck & Jr., 1999) in (Fatah & Fatanti, 1999). (2019).

Moreover, the number of Internet users in 2017 which was dominated by the age range of 19-34 years (49.52%) and the age of 35-54 years (39.55%) shows that the Internet has great capabilities as a new public space in Indonesia. The number of Internet users are mostly young people who have the opportunity to participate in political participation in the digital world. In line with the statement by Almond & Verba (1965) there are at least 5 aspects that can provide encouragement to the community's willingness to participate, including (1) modernization; (2) the influence of intellectual circles and modern mass communication; (3) widespread government involvement in the affairs of the community. economic, social, economic, and populist; (4) change in social class structure; (5) conflict between groups of political leaders.

Social media is also a way for politicians to attract the attention of young people. Politicians can use social media to showcase ideas and innovations as a means of campaigning to win regional head elections early. The strong role of social media in politics It is inevitable that it will attract attention, help young people improve their political education, and increase the participation of newcomers. (Munzir et al., 2019).

Thus, the current digitalization provides an opportunity for Indonesia's democratic system to improve itself from the negative impacts of patronage democracy. Democracy is known to the public as a way for someone to do money politics and even corruption. With digital democracy, campaigns can be carried out through social media and other platforms. In addition to being easier to do, campaign funding on social media is relatively cheap, and does not require large costs, so the possibility of potential candidates committing money politics or corruption is small, because there is no imposition of costs previously incurred.

## **CONCLUSION**

n practice, democracy in Indonesia is still characterized by a patronage model. One of the factors that causes the growth of patronage in the democratic process is the

underdeveloped moral public sphere. In the context of money politics, during the campaign period, Indonesian citizens only focused on direct material rewards which eventually grew the term vote buying and selling. This pattern causes a large amount of campaign costs incurred by each party and the candidate it nominates. The amount of campaign funding and being a very vital thing in the campaign process encourages candidates to need funding sources. The amount of money spent on campaigns can lead to the collection and refund of election funds from corruption such as trade licensing, policy bribes, etc., this is done to return campaign funds that have been spent.

The solution offered in this paper has two points. First, campaign funding is financed 100% by the state, in other words no other sources of funds are allowed to enter the party, including gifts from individuals, executives, and administrators from the parties concerned.

By placing the state as the main source of funds, parties and candidates do not need to look for other sources of funds, so as to avoid the political potential of the party's debt of gratitude to fund owners from outside the party. Second, digital democracy, or the ability to take advantage of the development of information technology, especially social media by conducting campaigns through social media.

The campaign that was originally carried out traditionally has transitioned into a digital campaign because social media has provided open space and implementation procedures by utilizing the available features. Regarding operational costs, campaigns using social media can also minimize the expenditure of funds disbursed by candidates. Thus, efforts to carry out money politics or vote buying will be reduced.

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