

## Review: Identity Politics and European Integration: The Case of Germany

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The central argument of this chapter is that the Europeanization of German nation-state identity is constructed by the political elites. Following World War II, German political elites built a European German nation-state identity. These identity constructions emerged throughout the interwar period and grew prominent among German elites pushed into exile during World War II. German Europeanness is also an example of how political elites manipulate and exploit collective nation-state identities for political gain.

After explaining his instrumentalist / constructivism theory approach as his framework in order to look national identity, he argues that political institutions and cultures as intervening factors between ideas about Europe and national collective identities (p.293). Author supports his argument with some historical evolution of a European nation-state identity in Germany. There are some path dependences in this chapter that important to explain this evolution: First, after World War 2, Chancellor Adenauer initiated the multilateralization of German foreign policy. He saw integration of the German state and western society as the best way to overcome Germany's past. The Europeanization of German nation-state identity began with the resistance to Hitler and the Nazis of exiled political leaders from both the SPD and the CDU. This type of identity construction then became dominant in the postwar Federal Republic. "Europe symbolized the values of democracy, human rights, and social justice, values that had to be preserved against the Nazis" (p.298).

Second, from the late 1950s, among German political elites from the center-right to the center-left, a federalist consensus ("United States of Europe") prevailed. Germany's nation-state identity embraced a modern Europe as a member of the Western community, based on liberal democracy and a social market economy, as part of the Western community. Even though there are some government changes and return from Christian Democratic Union to Social Democratic Party, this consensus never changes (p.300).

Third, while the end of the Cold War and German unification undoubtedly represented a critical juncture in German domestic politics, there was no fundamental debate about the country's foreign policy orientation, including its approach to European politics (p.302). Even though reunification appears to have had no effect on West German identity constructions, East German elites are likely to hold different views on European integration. However, the European identity constructions of major political parties have not been susceptible to change as a result of the accession of East German political elites. Even after unification, the majority of Germany's political elite shared Chancellor Kohl's belief that only deeper political and economic union could firmly anchor Germany in the West and strengthen European institutions to ensure peace in the years ahead (p.305).

Lastly, author highlight the moment when there is an issue currency integration under single currency of Euro. Identity politics must be used to understand German elite attitudes toward the EMU (European Monetary System). Support for the Euro equals support for European integration equals "good Europeanness" equals "good Germanness" equals overcoming Germany's militarist and nationalist past, according to policymakers, particularly Chancellor Helmut Kohl (p.307). As a result, this jargon effectively silenced what could have been strong domestic opposition. It became impossible to debate the Euro in purely economic terms and to weigh its costs and benefits in a politically neutral manner (p.315).