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The Beruang Hitam Paramilitary Struggle to Maintain Indonesian Independence in the Year of 1949 in Lampung

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Abstract: This study aims to determine the guerrilla struggle of the Beruang Hitam troops in defending Lampung so that it remains part of the independent Republic of Indonesia. This research is a qualitative research with historical methods and data collection techniques using the literature techniques, documentation, interviews with descendants of Abu Bakar Sidiq and the former of Beruang Hitam troops. The results of this study indicated that the Beruang Hitam paramilitary was a defense force for the country whose members consisted of ALRI (Navy of the Republic of Indonesia), the People and in their struggle several TNI asked to join. Beruang Hitam troops decided to carry out a guerrilla warfare strategy because of the bigger enemy force and unbalanced weaponry so that it was impossible to carry out an open warfare, besides Lampung geographic which was mostly forests, hills and mountains, it was very possible to use a guerrilla war strategy. The guerrilla war of Beruang Hitam troops spread throughout Lampung, namely: Lampung Selatan, Gedong Air, Kemiling, Sukadanaham, Way Lima, Gunung Sugih, Metro, and Lampung Utara. Beruang Hitam troops had a major contribution in defending Lampung and succeeded in maintaining the residency of Lampung in Bukit Kemuning, Lampung Utara. Before carrying out the attack, the Beruang Hitam troops always prepared the war strategies, defensive strategies and attack techniques which were the key to success in every battle.

Keywords: The Beruang Hitam Paramilitary, Abu Bakar Sidiq, Guerrilla Warfare, Struggle, Maintain the Independence of the Republic of Indonesia, War Strategy, Defensive Strategy, Offensive strategy.

1. INTRODUCTION

After Indonesia's independence was proclaimed on August 17, 1945, the Indonesian nation was dealing directly with the problem of maintaining independence that just achieved from the threat of foreign nations who tried to colonize Indonesia again. Efforts to defend independence were not easy but must be accompanied by great determination and sacrifice imbued with the spirit of patriotism and Indonesian nationalism. The Dutch attitude towards the proclamation of Indonesian independence seemed ignorant and even thought that this Indonesian independence was never existed.

The defeat of Japan against the allies made the Dutch try to regain control and colonize Indonesia by piggybacking on allies. The Dutch troops who infiltrated the NICA came with their allies to study the situation and influence the people as well as to infiltrate their troops into areas that were considered important. In this regard, the Dutch effort was a very dangerous threat to the resistances of the Indonesian who wanted lasting independence.

The struggle to defend Indonesia's independence kept continuing. On January 17, the Renville Agreement was finally signed, followed by the instructions to cease firing on January 19, 1948. The Renville agreement included the Demarcation Line known as the line of *Van Mook* with status quo bordering the Dutch rule and TNI which were still in Dutch occupation. By 1949, around the beginning of November and December 1948, the condition of the city of Tanjung Karang–Teluk Betung was relatively calm and safe, in the sense that there was no gunfire, firing, and explosions as if it was in a state of war. This was due to the fact that at that time there was a truce due to the Renville agreement, but actually it could not be said that the results of the Renville agreement were satisfactory, so as to guarantee the atmosphere of calm.

The very cunning Dutch used a ceasefire to strengthen themselves in their efforts to destroy the Republic of Indonesia. There was absolutely no good will in diplomacy and negotiations.

On December 19, 1949, the Dutch army launched the second aggression. The Dutch tried to occupy areas of the Republic of Indonesia and cities that were considered strategic, to expand their power and be able to re-colonize the Indonesian nation. Battles in the effort to defend Indonesian independence appeared everywhere in various remote areas of the country as well as in the Lampung area which was also under threat and attacks by the Dutch military.

On January 1, 1949, Panjang Port, located in the Panjang Lampung area, was the gateway on the southern tip of Sumatera and included in the territory of the ALRI, which was attacked by the Dutch army, because this sea battle was the first experience of the ALRI troops, so the troops were withdrawn and ordered to gather at the Km-21 Gedong Tataan, which was designated as the emergency headquarters of the ALRI troops. Then, in the headquarters emergency, a troop consolidation was carried out and resulted in the splitting of the troops into two troops, namely:

1. The Main Forces of ALRI led by Captain C. Souhoka, served on the Southern front.
2. The Military Vehicle Troop led by Lettu. Abu Bakar Sidiq, served in Lampung.

In addition, the Military Vehicle Troop was tasked with accommodating members of the ALRI who were separated from the main force to join the troops of Abu Bakar Sidiq. (Abu Bakar Sidiq's personal record document, 1981: 18)

In Lampung, efforts to defend the newly achieved independence from the Dutch became a serious problem. The increasingly chaotic situation succeeded in making the members of the ALRI Lampung separated or scattered from the main force, so that, on January 2, 1949, based on the results of the deliberations of Abu Bakar Sidiq and his troops, they decided to form a people's troop under the name Beruang Hitam Troop.

Laskar (paramilitary) comes from the Urdu language of *Lashkar* which means soldiers, troops, or militia. During the Japanese Occupation, the term of people paramilitary (*Laskar Rakyat*) was used to call out the Gyugun (volunteer troops), the local version of PETA (Cribb, 2010: 96).

Beruang Hitam Paramilitary continued to recruit and even formed other irregulars, and

provided military training that cooperated with the TNI in Lampung.

BeruangHitamTroops decided to run a guerrilla war strategy in the effort of maintaining the independence of the Republic of Indonesia in Lampung because the strength of a greater enemy and weaponry that were not balanced so it was not possible open warfare, in addition to the geographical Lampung that most forests, hills, and mountains, it was possible to use guerrilla war strategy.

BeruangHitam troops were known as brave troops and had high fighting spirit, in their struggle, the BeruangHitam troop was an army that was considered a threat by the enemy because it had never failed and always succeeded in disrupting the defense and causing unrest for the Dutch Army, besides its strategy and the guerrilla movements, it was not easily guessed by the enemy.

However, it was unfortunate though troop of BeruangHitam making a major contribution towards the efforts of maintaining Lampung defense to remain a part of the Republic of Indonesia's independence that was not recognized by the people of Lampung. This is due to the lack of a historian or researcher who examines the BeruangHitam troops led by Abu BakarSidiqcomprehensively, so that, very few references to these troops and almost non-existent.

The references or documents, even barely found, made researchers to seek the traces, to get more data by visiting the residence of Abu BakarSidiq in the Bukit, Kemuning District, Lampung Utara, then proceed to the hideout inUlakRengas Village, Lampung Utara Regency. The researcher conducted interviews with the descendants of Abu BakarSidiq and the former BeruangHitam troop, and researcher obtained documents or personal records ofAbu BakarSidiq.

Based on the background of the writing above, the author is interested in examining the guerrilla struggle carried out by the BeruangHitam troops in defending the independence of the Republic of Indonesia in Lampung, 1949.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. The Concept of BeruangHitamParamilitary

Laskar(paramilitary) comes from the Urdu language *Lashkar*, which means army, troops, or militia. During the Japanese Occupation, the term of people's paramilitary (Laskar Rakyat) was used to call out the Gyugun (volunteer troops), the local version of PETA (Cribb, 2010: 96).

Based on the results of the interview, the living witness of the former BeruangHitam troop, IbnuHusin said that the BeruangHitam troop was a troop led by Abu BakarSidiqwho fought against the Dutch in Lampung Selatan, Lampung Tengah, and especially Lampung Utara.

Meanwhile, according to Safawi who was also a living testimony of the former BeruangHitam troop stated that the BeruangHitamtroop was a combination of people, ALRI, and cooperation with the TNI, and other paramilitaries that aimed to disrupt the defense of dutch, to cause the anxiety for the Dutch soldiers.

Based on the opinion above, so It can be concluded that the BeruangHitamtroop is a joint force of the people and ALRI led by Abu BakarSidiq in the effort of destroying the Dutch troops from Lampung so that Lampung remains part of the independent state of Indonesia.

2. The Concept of Struggle to Maintain Independence

C.S.T Kansil and Julianto, 1996: 182 defines "the struggle as a pioneer who brings the nation to the front of a gate of independence with all the sacrifices".

According to Poerdarminto, "defending is trying to remain or leave to its original state while independence is a freedom from colonialism or freedom to stand alone". (1985: 674).

The proclamation of independence for the Republic of Indonesia which was declared by Ir. Soekarno and Drs. M.Hatta on behalf of the Indonesian nation on August 17, 1945, was very important for all Indonesian because with this proclamation, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia was born, which was independent and sovereign.

As mentioned by Tirtiprojo, the struggle of the Indonesian nation to defend independence was carried out, whether it was a diplomatic struggle or confrontational, this was done so that the Independent Republic of Indonesia could be maintained (Tirtiprojo, 1966: 32).

In addition, Muhaimin argues that "the form of the Indonesian nation's struggle in defending independence is that among the military and all the people using a diplomatic strategy (non-physical) and using a violent-armed (physical) strategy" (Yahya A. Muhaimin, 1982: 28).

Based on the opinion above, it can be concluded that defending independence is an effort to keep, protect, and defend oneself from various threats that can endanger a free life from the colonial system either by means of diplomacy or confrontation.

3. Guerrilla War

According to Simatupang, Guerrilla war is together with the people and troops who must maintain the outside strength where the place occupied by the enemy and must attack enemy positions, and disrupt traffic between places occupied by the enemy, troops must avoid fighting if the enemy attacks with greater force and if possible attack enemies (Simatupang: 91)

Meanwhile, according to Poerdarminta, guerrilla war is a battle that is not to confront but surreptitiously. (1976: 319).

Based on some of the opinion above, so these can be explained that the implementation of guerrilla warfare is a process or the design of a guerrilla war which is carried out clandestinely and avoid the enemy when attacked with greater force and if possible the enemy should be attacked. The guerrilla tactics according to Nasution were two things, namely:

First, the guerrilla strategy was to tie up as many enemies as possible, tiring, squeezing as much blood and sweat as possible, and shaking his nerves. Guerrilla is to appear-disappear, pacing everywhere so that the enemy could not be found anywhere but felt to be attacking everywhere. Second, Guerrilla tactics are to force the enemy to scatter everywhere and to rely on the proper system of fortification. Big enemies must be avoided, small enemies must be surrounded and destroyed, and their tools are deprived (Nasution, 1984: 37)

4. METHOD

This research is a descriptive study using historical method. Notosusanto explains that the historical method is: a set of principles or systematic rules intended to provide effective assistance in the effort of collecting the material for history, evaluating critically, and presenting a synthesis of the results in the written form (1984: 11).

Furthermore, Notosusanto research divides history / historical into 4 steps:

1. Heuristics, is the process of searching, finding, and collecting traces past.
2. Criticism, is investigating whether the traces are genuine or not.
3. Interpretation, is determining the sense of the best touch with the facts obtained.
4. Historiography, is conveying the synthesis obtained in the form of a story. (1984:18)

Data collection techniques in this study are literature, interview, and documentation techniques. While the data analysis technique is utilizing the qualitative data analysis techniques.

5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. The Situation in Lampung after the Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia

On August 12, 1945, Mr. Abbas, the head of Lampung *Syusungkai* (*Resident Advisory Board*) left to Jakarta to fulfill the summons of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence. News about the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Indonesia in Lampung was officially announced by Mr. Abbas on August 24, 1945, heard the news about the proclamation of independence, the youth and people of Lampung welcomed him with enthusiasm and joy. (Council of Regional Forces Day '45, 1994: 124)

On August 24, at the Madrasa Islamicin the village mosque of Teluk Betung was held a meeting that was opened by the community leaders, figures, parties, militant youths, including the former officers of Gyugun and Heiho. The meeting was chaired by Emir Moh and Wan Abdurahman, the decision of the meeting was the formation of an organization called API (Indonesian Youth Force). API wanted Japan to give up its power as soon as possible, but even though Japan had surrendered to its allies and Indonesia had proclaimed its independence, Japan was adamant, and did not want to hand over its power and weapons to Indonesia.

After Japan surrendered to the allies, and as a consequence Japan had to give back all its former colonies to the allies, for this implementation, Japan had to maintain order and security of all the areas that were occupied. This situation was exploited by the Dutch to piggyback on their allies with the aim of disarming the Japanese so that the Dutch could regain control of Indonesia. In this case, the fighting took place everywhere in strategic areas, including the Lampung area.

2. General Atmosphere of Lampung By 1949

By 1949, around November-December 1948, the city of Tanjung Karang– Teluk Betung was relatively safe because it was in a truce due to the Renville Agreement at that time. Hence actually, it could not be said that the Renville Agreement was satisfactory. Among politicians in the Republic of Indonesia, the Renville agreement caused disputes between pro and contra groups, resulted in a cabinet crisis, as well as among the military, it was also considered very detrimental. Due to the fact of the Renville Agreement, Indonesia was heavily pressured by the Dutch, for example from an economic side, the Renville agreement was very detrimental to the Indonesian side because potential and surplus areas were controlled by the Dutch, and Indonesia only controlled areas that were minus or did not bring prosperity to its population. The difficulties of economic, political, social and military conditions, coupled with the less harmonious relationship between politicians in the government and the military, made

Indonesia's situation worse. When Indonesia was confronting Dutch aggression, even there was a PKI rebellion in Madiun. It was felt as the backstab against the Indonesian nation. Fortunately, the echoes of the rebellion in Lampung did not shake the socio-political foundations and the people in general.

In a truce, the atmosphere was like a fire in the husks, meant that at any time it could be lit again. The very cunning Dutch used a cease-fire to strengthen themselves in their efforts to destroy the Republic of Indonesia. The Netherlands always looked for reasons that did not make sense to violate the articles of the agreement that were previously agreed upon. Besides the military violations in the status Quo area, the Netherlands also pursued a policy of divide et impera by forming puppet states. The purpose of forming a puppet state was to make RI even more pinched and the Netherlands carried out its wishes or dictate to RI according to their plans easily. The Netherlands deliberately refused to resolve breaches of treaty violations at the negotiation table.

The existence of different interpretations or views among politicians of holding government power that were consisted of political party figures, and differences of attitudes between the civilian government and the military regarding to the Renville agreement were also recognized by the Dutch and considered as a factor that weakened the Republic of Indonesia. However, despite differences in views, especially the military, they remained loyal to protect and defend the independence that had been proclaimed.

At the beginning of 1949, the Dutch launched the second military aggression at the strategic and potential areas, including Lampung. Of course, the Lampung military forces were preparing to defend their homeland. (Regional Daily Council Force '45, 1994: 326)

3. The Formation of Beruang Hitam Paramilitary

On January 1, 1949, at about 05.00 a.m, the Dutch warship approached the Panjang port of Lampung, but was greeted with gunfire by the Navy of Republic of Indonesia (ALRI) and were responded with gunfire, cannons, and mortars by the Dutch. Since the sea battle was the first experience for ALRI, and the state of the weaponry was very unbalanced, then ALRI troops were ordered to retreat and to gather at the KM-21 Gedong Tataan, which was designated as the emergency headquarters of ALRI troops. Then, it carried out the consolidation at the headquarters for the troops and forces that resulted in the breakdown into two, namely:

- a. The Main forces of ALRI led by Captain C. Souhoka, served at the front center of South.
- b. Military Vehicle forces were led by Lettu. Abu Bakar Sidiq, served in Lampung, especially Lampung Utara.

Based on the notebook of Abu Bakar Sidiq, Military Vehicle forces were not just served in Lampung Utara, hence Captain C. Souhoka ruled that Abu Bakar Sidiq forces operated throughout Lampung and accommodated when there were other ALRI troops who separated from the main forces.

The threat to control Lampung from the Dutch kept coming, which succeeded in igniting the enthusiasm of the people of Lampung to help the military by forming people's paramilitaries. The paramilitaries that appeared at that time included the Hizbullah paramilitary, the panther paramilitary and others.

Lampung conditions was tense with the limited weaponry at the time, made a lot of ALRI members were killed and scattered as well as Abu BakarSidiq Military Vehicle forces so that he and the other remain members had initiative to recruit people of Lampung who wanted to participate against the enemy and provided military training to them so that based on the agreement, a BeruangHitamparamilitary was formed, led by Abu BakarSidiq, which was a combination of the people and ALRI, even because of the greatness of these troops, some TNI members asked to join the BeruangHitam paramilitary.

The more incessant attacks from the Dutch that were carried out continuously made the Lampung residency move, namely from Tataan to Gadingrejo, Pagelaran, Way Tenong, and finally to Sumber Jaya where the center of government was in Bukit Kemuning, Lampung Utara because only the Lampung Utara region was not able to be controlled as a whole by the Dutch army.

Bukit Kemuning, which was also the hometown of Abu BakarSidiq, became the main object of attacks by the Dutch. This was a big threat to the BeruangHitam troops which were also headquartered in Bukit Kemuning and had the aim of defending Lampung, especially in Lampung Utara. To increase the defense, Abu BakarSidiq needed to recruit the members of his BeruangHitam troops, and ordered Sergeant Major Adharto meet all village heads in MargaRebangSeputih (now Bukit Kemuning), to collect all Carbines, dubulop and locok weapons in each village, and if they had been gathered, reported to the BeruangHitam Troop staff immediately.

The available weapons would be used by their owners who would be registered to join the BeruangHitam paramilitary, then they would be given military training. At that time, there were 350 weapons. The training sites were:

- a. In the village of UlakRengas
- b. In the village of Tanjung Raja

After completing the training, those who were capable were selected to be placed at the outpost, joining the existing BeruangHitam troops with the aim of pressing the enemy so that they could not occupy the Lampung residency, it was in Bukit Kemuning, Lampung Utara at that time.

4. Guerrilla War of BeruangHitam Troops

On the night of January 3, 1949, the BeruangHitam troops, numbered 90 ALRI and 30 people, began to introduce their names in South Lampung. The first target was the Power Plant of GedongPakuonin Lampung Selatan. Sergeant Anuar and Sergeant Adhar were previously ordered by Abu BakarSidiq to scout the war site and then returned to the forest where they were hiding and beginning to prepare war tactics. First, the war strategy used was to dig up the ground and cover it with leaves and branches, to stalk the enemy on cliffs and make surprise attacks. Second was the offensive tactics. The attack was carried out at night, waiting for the enemy to enter into a trap and the command of the troops to attack them aggressively. Third, the troop defense strategies were made in one large group to shoot targets simultaneously. At the midnight, BeruangHitam troops were getting-ready on the cliff, lurked, and waited for enemies to come and get trapped that they had been created. Once the enemy got trapped, Abu BakarSidiq counted to three. "BeruangHitam" was shouted when shooting the target, the war ended with the deaths of several soldiers of Netherlands (Interview with the

former Beruang Hitam troop, Mr. Safawi).

5. Guerrilla War of Beruang Hitam Troop in Gedong Air Kemiling

After the war in the Gedong Pakuon factory, our troops, the "Beruang Hitam troops", began planning to carry out guerrilla warfare in Gedong Air and Kemiling. The strategic or hilly location made the Beruang Hitam troops carry out reconnaissance using binoculars on the hill, blocking the Dutch patrol car as well as seizing weapons. Divided the troops into two parts, namely the right wing and the left wing, and decided to carry out the attack at night. At exactly 10 o'clock our "Beruang Hitam troop" got ready on the cliff while stalking the enemy. When the Dutch soldiers were negligent, Abu Bakar Sidiq exclaimed 'Beruang Hitam' and we immediately shot continuously without giving the enemy to retaliate, eventually opponents backed off and we were all of the troops of Beruang Hitam saved, and did not forget to thank Allah S.W.T for the salvation of all members. (Interview with the former Beruang Hitam troop, Mr. Safawi)

The results of the interview above were in accordance with the data obtained from personal document record of Abu Bakar Sidiq, which explained that after the guerrilla war at the Gedong Pakuon factory, the next target of war was on January 4, 1949, in Gedong Air and Kemiling. Then, prepared to make tactics namely: first, the used strategy was to spy on the enemy on the cliffs and intercept the Dutch patrol car and seize the enemy's weaponry. The second was tactic of attack that carried out at night, waiting for the enemy to be under the cliff, waiting for the command of the troops to attack the enemy aggressively without giving the enemy a chance to return fire. The third was defense strategy. In the defense strategy stage, the troops were divided into two parts, namely: the right wing by Sergeant Anuar who led 60 troops, the left wing by Sergeant Major Adhar who led 60 troops, and Abu Bakar Sidiq in between the two sections or brigade to give orders.

Around 10 p.m, the Beruang Hitam troops were getting ready on the cliffs, lurking, and waiting for the enemy to come out of their headquarters. At that time, the Dutch soldiers had just returned home after carrying out a clean-up operation around Kemiling. They casually walked because the defense of the TNI in Lampung was considered very weak because they could seize Teluk Betung and Tanjung Karang and its surroundings so they did not realize that the Beruang Hitam Troops were lurking.

After the soldiers were a few meters from the bottom of the cliff, Abu Bakar Sidiq gave the orders while saying for the "Beruang Hitam". The shots were fired by the two brigades incessantly so that there was no chance for the opponent to return fire then the Beruang Hitam troops quickly disappeared by zig-zagging to eliminate the traces, and continue towards hiding.

In this war, the Beruang Hitam troops succeeded in repelling the Dutch Army and obtained weapons spoils in the form of:

- a. Five carbines
- b. Three stun guns, and
- c. One parabellum and bullets

The following day, January 5, 1949, the escort soldiers reported that there were four TNI men who wanted to meet Abu Bakar Sidiq as the leader of the Beruang Hitam Troops. Abu Bakar Sidiq came out from the hiding inside the forest, to go with the TNI men. Their arrival

was the wish to join the BeruangHitam troops. They were ¹ Sergeant Major M. Yasin, Sergeant Major M. Ilyas, Private I Adenium Umar, and Private I Ilyas.

To ease the movement, guerrilla disrupted every night at the four corners, the BeruangHitam Troops agreed to make a defense strategy by dividing the troops into four large brigades consisting of two sections, namely:

- a. ¹ Abu BakarSidiq as Commander of the Troops.
- b. Commander of Section I Brigade 1, Sergeant Major Adhar led 30 people.
- c. Commander of Section I Brigade 1, Sergeant Major Anuar led 30 people.
- d. Commander of Section I Brigade 1, Sergeant Major M. Yasin led 30 people.
- e. Commander of Section I Brigade 1, Sergeant Major M. Ilyas led 30 people. (Interview with the formerBeruangHitam troop, Mr. Safawi)

Since then, the BeruangHitam troops rattled the Dutch Army because every night, the four places alternately were successfully messed up with careful preparation of war tactics. During the war, the BeruangHitam Troops always succeeded in repelling the Dutch soldiers. Seeing the danger of guerrilla attacks of the Black Bear Troops, the Dutch soldiers tried to find a hiding place of the BeruangHitamTroops, but never succeeded because this hiding place was isolated from the community. (Abu BakarSidiq's personal note document).

6. Guerrilla War of BeruangHitam Troop in Sukadanaham

After about three and a half months, the BeruangHitam Troop was guerrilla, disrupting the defense of the Dutch army in Gedong Air and Kemiling around mid-April 1949, the BeruangHitam troops moved towards Sukadanaham. Abu Bakar Sidiq got information from his spies that the Dutch army headed to Sukadanaham, then Abu BakarSidiq immediately prepared a war strategy, namely stalking the enemy on the cliffs, and carrying out a surprise attack after the enemy was under the cliff.

In terms of defense, forces were divided into four, namely: Brigade I Sergeant Major Adhar led 30 people, Brigade II Sergeant Anuar led 30 people, Brigade III Sergeant Major M. Yasin led 30 people, and Brigade IV Abu Bakar Sidiq led 31 people.

The brigade troop 1,2, and 3 were at the top of the cliff, and brigade 4 was guarding on the line front. After the Dutch army was seen approaching it down, the screech of the "BeruangHitam" was shouted furiously, grenades were thrown and shots were followed. Finally, the Dutch army retreated to save themselves, but brigades 1,2, and 3 followed after firing back shots until many Dutch troops fell.(Interview with the former BeruangHitam, Mr. Safawi).

7. Guerrilla War of BeruangHitam Troop in Way Lima

The guerrilla war was continued to Way Lima where Captain Margono's weapons factory was located. There, met Lieutenant I Ismail Latif and Young Lieutenant Tajuddin, Lieutenant I Gustamromli, Lieutenant Alimuddin, and others. That day, Abu BakarSidiq discussed on how to attack the Dutch soldiers who had succeeded in occupying Tataan.

Because the weaponry was not in balance with the enemy's weaponry, it was agreed that the attack was carried out in guerrilla. After a few days at Way Lima, began to divide tasks among the brigades to take turns guerrilla warfare towards way harong and around Tataan. The war strategy used was to sabotage the car Dutch patrol with the tactic of shooting the

enemy continuously without giving the enemy a chance.

In this attack, many Dutch soldiers died because in this attack TNI troops led by Lieutenant Alimuddin also participated in the attack. In this battle, he succeeded in seizing weapons from the enemy in the form of: two crates of mortar bumbung, one bumbung of tek and to, and several boxes of LIF and Stun guns, carbine bullets (Abu Bakar Sidiq's personal record document).

8. Guerrilla War of Beruang Hitam Troop on Gunung Sugih and Metro

Around mid-May, at 7 o'clock in the evening, the black bear troops moved towards Central Lampung. Heading to Kampung Bumi Batu continued to Simpang Bekri. Abu Bakar Sidiq sent a letter to Captain Supomo at Bekri that the Beruang Hitam Troops were at the Bekri intersection to help defending the highway and assist Captain Supomo's men who were in Wates.

Like the strategy of war in this battle, this time it was still the same as the previous strategy of war, namely stalking the enemy, carrying out sudden attacks, and shooting opponents continuously, but the defense strategy in this battle, the troops were divided into three: right wing led by Sergeant Major Adhar, left wing led by Sergeant Major Ilyas with the members of Sergeant Anuar and M. Yasin, and in the middle, it was led by Abu Bakar Sidiq.

The first guerrilla warfare attack by shouting "Beruang Hitam" was carried out by the right wing to shoot the enemy continuously, and followed by the left wing using machine guns and stun guns because the attacks continued from the right and left, the Dutch army felt overwhelmed so they retreated and returned to Trimorejo. In this battle, the Beruang Hitam Squad received several dozen grenades, two stun guns, and one carbine. (Interview with the former Beruang Hitam troop, Mr. Safawi)

After about half a month moving around the metro, the Beruang Hitam troops agreed to block the Dutch army at the 3 intersection of Bedeng 35. This time the Beruang Hitam Troops with four metro paramilitaries. Four metro paramilitaries set traps. Abu Bakar Sidiq held two paraliams, waiting for the Dutch to be trapped by gunfire from four metro paramilitaries who stayed in the middle of intersection 3, Abu Bakar Sidiq pretended to be shot when the Dutch troops approached, He suddenly shouted "Beruang Hitam", heard and shots from the right and the left were continuously intensified. Finally, many Dutch troops died.

This attack increasingly made the Beruang Hitam troops known as a tough and respected army by the Dutch troops so that they continuously searched for the hiding place of the Beruang Hitam Troops but it always failed.

9. Guerrilla War of Beruang Hitam Troop in Lampung Utara

Around the beginning of July, Abu Bakar Sidiq and his troops headed to Lampung Utara, to secure the origin area of his birth because only Lampung Utara area had not been attacked by the Dutch army. Then, Abu Bakar Sidiq contacted M. Nurdin, the Commander of the Mubil Battalion so that the Beruang Hitam troop could join his army. At around 12p.m, a messenger from M. Nurdin arrived ordering Abu Bakar Sidiq and the Beruang Hitam troops to head to Kotabumi because the situation on the Front was critical.

At night, the Beruang Hitam troops moved towards Haji pemanggian through Kampung Komereng directly to the station to meet troops of Captain Supomo. The

attack strategy was prepared, namely the war was carried out in secret, surprise attacks, and moved around. The second was the offensive tactics. The attack was carried out after a "BeruangHitam" screamed and fired at the target continuously from all directions. Third was defense strategies. Defense was carried out by dividing the troops into 4 brigades, namely: brigade 1 led by Sergeant Major Adhar to assist the front troops, Brigade 2 led by Sergeant Anuar occupied TalangLepangDalam, Brigades 3 and 4, namely Sergeant Major M. Yasin and Sergeant Major M. Ilyas occupied Cempaka Village .

Around 10 p. m, a gun-shot was heard between Captain Supomo's troops and the Dutch troops led by Lieutenant Van Hutten, Rimpen, and Kaligis. At 8 a.m, the reconnaissance soldiers came to report that the Dutch troops had arrived, the BeruangHitam troops immediately climbed to the cliff, to look at the opponent, came to shoot and waited for the commando. When the opponent was under the cliff,theBeruangHitam troops opened fire without giving the opponent a chance to retaliate.

When the BeruangHitam troops were resting, messengers came and gave a warrant from a commanderbattalion Major M.NurdinPanji that contained to BeruangHitam troops so they could occupy Banjar Ratu, overseeing the railroad tracks, and the troops of Lieutenant IISai Sohar occupied highway, survived to slow the dutch troop movements headed to Kotabumi. At 3 o'clock in the morning, there was the sound of gunfire from Sai Sohar's troops, the battle broke out and it was won by the Dutch so that the Dutch troops continued to walk towardsKotabumi without anyone who blocking it.

On July 12, 1949 Sergeant Major Adhar met all the heads of the village of MargaRebangSeputih (now Bukit Kemuning) to collectall weapons of Carbines, dubulop, and locokin each village and immediately reported to the BeruangHitam Troop staff. What I heard was that the weapons would be used by their own owners who would be registered as members of the BeruangHitam paramilitary. After completing the registration of weapons, they were trained militarily about 350 people and their weapons (Interview with the former BeruangHitam troop, Mr. IbnuHusin)

The statement above was following the document recorded by Abu BakarSidiq who also stated that in order to defend the residency of Lampung, in Bukit Kemuning, members of the BeruangHitam troops must be added by recruiting people who had weapons and they were given the military training in UlakRengas Village and Tanjung Raja Campus.

The part of the Lampung area that could be controlled by the Dutch was Kotabumi. The territory of Kotabumi which was successfully controlled by the Dutch caused restlessness for the BeruangHitam troops so that Abu BakarSidiq deployed the BeruangHitamtroopsto all parts of Lampung Utara, including the village ofNapalBelah, Ogan Lima, Way Cempaka and Bukit Kemuning (Interview with the former BeruangHitamtroop, Mr. IbnuHusin)

When Kotabumi had been successfully occupied and there had been a consolidation between the homeland Defense troops, then Abu Bakar Sidiq made a defense strategy to carry out his duties properly, a division of tasks was held with areas occupied by troops:

- a. The panther troops in Cempaka, operated towards Kotabumi.
- b. Sergeant Anuar's troops from the BeruangHitam inside of TalangLepang.
- c. Hizbuallah troops in TalangSabuk.
- d. Sergeant Major M. Yasin's troops from theBeruangHitam with staff at TalangBunglaiand hidden posts in Way Kunang.

- e. Sergeant Major Ilyas from the BeruangHitam at Talang40, operated to assist Lieutenant II Mustofaif it was needed.
- f. Sergeant Major Adhar's troops with a force of 2 sections, staffed in Ogan Lima, operated to assist other troops that was required.
- g. Lieutenant Mustofa's troops were based in Pekurun.
- h. The troops of Lieutenant II SastroSumedi and Lieutenant IIJohansyahwere staffed at Tanjungraja.
- i. The BeruangHitam troopswere45 members entirely of naval marine led by Lieutenant Abu BakarSidiq.
- j. Sergeant Isaac RK's troops staffed inCahaya Negeri (Council of Regional Forces Day '45 1994: 49) (According to Mr. Safawi, the defense of North)

Lampung area continued to be done according to each task. The BeruangHitam troops and guerrilla troops kept demolishing the Dutch defense which at the time was based in Kotabumi. It must not let the dutch soldiers managed to enterOgan Lima and Napal Belah towards Bukit Kemuning where temporary residency was located. The obstruction of Dutch army in Ogan Lima and Napal Belah which were located close to Kotabumi and Bukit Kemuning, were carried out by stalking the enemy, setting traps, and shooting targets continuously (Interview with the former BeruangHitam troop, Mr. Safawi)

Until August 1949, according to the instructions of the commander of the ALRI about the holding of *ceasefire* between the Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia, a commission was formed, namely the *Local Joint Committe* to set up the implementation of *ceasefire* in the area of Lampung residency law. From the ALRI, represented by Captain C.Shohoka, since the *ceasefire* was conducted, the ALRI troops from the LA Lampung Base began to consolidate the personnel sector by re-gathering members who had been scattered followed by recognition of sovereignty from the Dutch.

On December 27, 1949, a ceremony was held at 09.00 a.m with the raising of the Red and White Flag and lowering the Dutch flag at the PJKA Kotabumi Field. This ceremony was symbolic of the handover of the Lampung area from the Dutch (Council of Regional Forces Day '45. 1994: 391).

6. DISCUSSION

The independence of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945 was still marked by many struggles in terms of defending the newly achieved independence from foreign nations who tried to regain control over Indonesian territory which was considered strategic, in this case Lampung did not escape as the target of the Netherlands. The Dutch attempt to control Lampung began when the Dutch arrived on January 1, 1949 at Panjang port. This attack by the Dutch army not only made the Indonesian military alert and put up resistance but also burnt out the fire of fighting spirit of Lampung people, so that the struggle to defend the independence of the Republic of Indonesian in Lampung was not only carried out by the military but all the people of Lampung, one of which was the BeruangHitam troop.

After the formation of the BeruangHitam troop, it was agreed that the struggle would be carried out in a guerrilla manner. The bigger enemy weaponry and strength became the basis of the struggle carried out in guerrilla with the aim of disrupting the defense of the Dutch army and causing anxiety to the enemy.

The enemy force was bigger and more sophisticated weaponry, the attack could not be carried out suddenly without careful preparation of war tactics, so that war guerrilla Beruang Hitam troops always began with the preparation of a war strategy, attack techniques, and defense strategy. This war strategy preparation aimed to make the troops better prepared to carry out attacks so that they could avoid defeat.

The guerrilla warfare of the Beruang Hitam troops was scattered all over Lampung namely: Lampung Selatan, Gedong Air, Kemiling, Sukadanaham, Way Lima, Gunung Sugih, Metro, and Lampung Utara. The Beruang Hitam troops in their guerrillas never failed, even if they always managed to grab weapons from the opposing side. The high fighting spirit and desire for lasting independence and the skill of Abu Bakar Sidiq in designing a war strategy became a tremendous force for the Beruang Hitam Troops against the enemy.

A sense of the spirit of independence and a very strong desire to be separated from colonialism and continuing resistance by the Beruang Hitam troops together with other troops which turned out to be able to make the Dutch felt overwhelmed, and in the end the steps of December 27, 1949, was held a ceremony to raise the red and white flag at the PJKA Kotabumi field as a symbol of the handover of the Lampung area, which meant that Lampung remained part of the Independent of Republic of Indonesia.

7. CONCLUSION

The implementation of guerrilla warfare by the Beruang Hitam troops first went through the stages of war strategy preparation, namely the preparation of war strategies, offensive techniques, and defense strategies. The war strategy carried out by the Beruang Hitam Troops were stalking the enemy, carrying out sabotage, setting traps by digging the ground, and attacking the enemy suddenly. The attack techniques of guerrilla warfare of Beruang Hitam troops were attacks carried out at night or early in the morning, and shooting the enemy continuously without giving the enemy a chance to retaliate. The Beruang Hitam troop defense strategy was to divide the troops into several brigades and scattered in various directions so that the enemy felt surrounded. The Beruang Hitam troop guerrilla war aimed to destabilize the enemy's defenses and caused unrest to the enemy. Beruang Hitam guerrilla troops all over Lampung and ending in Lampung Utara where the Lampung residency was. Beruang Hitam troops had a role in preventing the Dutch troops from taking control of Lampung again.

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