CHAPTER 5

The Sociological Context of Religion in Indonesia

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Abstract

As the largest archipelagic state in the world, Indonesia has a unique and diverse religious landscape in various aspects. The spread of religions in the country that assimilate with local culture results in the difference of religious life in society. Religious politics run by the government and the rapid development of information technology have increased the complexity of relations between various institutions related to religion. Thus, in this context, the religious phenomenon is often a challenging field to study. This paper aims to examine religious life in Indonesia from a sociological perspective by discussing four main sub-themes: socio-historical development, the relationship between the state and religion, religious-based social conflict, and the impact of information technology on religious life in Indonesia.

Keywords

religion – sociological context – Indonesia

Since the Enlightenment Era, Western researchers, including prominent sociologists Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Max Weber, have made predictions about the decline in religion's role for human life due to modernization.[1] However, the development of religion in the past few decades is in contradiction with their predictions. In many cultures, including in secular and atheist countries, religion now plays a central role. Changes in religious demographics and religious social movements in various countries can serve as indicators for the development of religion. As the world's largest Muslim country, Indonesia has undergone significant changes in religious life. This paper aims

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 | DOI:10.1163/9789004416987_006

to examine various aspects of religious life in Indonesia viewed from the sociological perspective.

5.1 Socio Historical Aspect of Religion in Indonesia

As a multicultural country where the world's significant religions exist, live, and develop, Indonesia has a long history of the dynamics of religious demographics of its population. Animism and dynamism were Indonesia's fundamental beliefs far before the religious influences outside Indonesia. Hinduism and Buddhism came under the influence of India from the beginning of the first century, and Islam has grown under the influence of Arabic traders engaging in commercial trades with some monarchs in the archipelago since the 13th century. The European missionaries brought Christianity and Catholicism during the Age of Imperialism in Indonesia. According to Crandall (2012, pp. 18, 155), Islam has developed in Indonesia, especially in the Kingdom of Aceh on the island of Sumatra. Islam spread across Java in the 14th century and other islands in Southeast Asia, including coastal areas of Peninsular Malaysia. In Indonesia, Hindus and Indian Buddhists' migrations to Java and Bali occurred in the early first century, which were marked by the temple constructions. Bali is the country's only region with a major religion of Hinduism. However, Hinduism and Buddhism are minority religions in Indonesia. The majority of Indonesia's population are Sunni Muslims.

Indonesia, especially the remote areas of Java, has various beliefs, thoughts, and groups of faith. There are 187 groups of beliefs in Indonesia, and most of them are in Central Java, with 53 groups of faith (https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/11/09/12190141/; accessed February 21, 2018). There are at least two reasons as to why the government did not recognize the sect of beliefs as a religion during the New Order Era. First, groups of faith emerged as a reaction to the established religions that ignore the need for mystical expression and experience (Mulder, 2001). Second, the development of *kebatinan* or Javanese faith is a reaction to modernity with all its impacts. Modernization has the consequence of degenerating morality and the original of Javanese culture and values, so mysticism wanted to restore these high values (de Jong, 1984). The issue of beliefs in Indonesia still faces problems and challenges such as no recognition by the state, in the workplace and social interaction (Mahestu, 2018).

The process of spreading religions, especially Islam in Indonesia, is a unique phenomenon. It was practically inseparable from the roles of *Walisongo* (the Nine Saints), who used a humanistic approach to embrace religious values in the community who at that time adhered to various traditional beliefs. This

approach succeeded in Islamizing the archipelago without encountering substantial resistance. Nevertheless, there are variations in understanding Islam among the regions as a consequence of the interaction between local culture and Islam. A study conducted by Ali (2011) found the differences in Islamic practices between Javanese and Sulawesi communities. In terms of the religious spectrum, Javanese society is more plural than Sulawesi. The Islamic community in Java has adopted Animism, Hinduism and Buddhism, and Islam into their cultural systems. Missionaries tried to accommodate the local culture on their mission of spreading religions. In Sulawesi, the accommodation of local culture into religion is relatively low. Javanese culture is more open and tolerant towards cultural differences, while Sulawesi shows a legalistic tendency. Dutch historians de Graaf and Pigeaud (1989) stated that the entry of Islam into various ethnic groups in Indonesia did not take place in the same way.

The peaceful spread of Islam without any cultural chaos represents cultural strategies used by the propagators of religions or *missionaries*. According to Johns (1961), Sufism was an essential element for the spread of Islam in Indonesia. Sufis teach patterns of religious doctrine with a personal approach. Sufi is an orthodox Islamic community that has a high moral spirit with a willingness to accept and use elements of Indonesian culture. It offers sound advice about encouraging goodness and preventing evil, also known as *Amar Makruf Nahi Mungkar*. They also oppose non-Muslim rulers based on the Holy War to gain victory. The Sufis played their roles in spreading Islam. Benda (1962) says that the Sufis were from India. Islamic expansion in Indonesia started taking place from the palaces or kingdoms to the ordinary people.

The Sufis' role in spreading Islam then gains great appreciation from the community, and even then it is kept alive in various traditions in the form of respect for their tombs. The Sufis' tombs are still frequently visited by people who consider them holy tombs. A study conducted by Puspitasari, Djunaedi, and Putra (2012) shows that in Kampung Luar Batang (Jakarta) there is a Muslim missionary tomb from Hadramaut (Yemen) named Al Habib Husein bin Alaydrus, which is visited by many pilgrims. Activities such as religious ritual, traditional customs, and business are combined uniquely around the tomb. This tradition has been preserved since the Colonial Era. Similar traditions are also found in other cities such as Maqom Habib Noh in Singapore, Maqom Habib in Siak Jambi, Penyengat Island in Tanjung Pinang Bintan, Demak, Cirebon, Madura, Gresik, and Surabaya, as well as in Malaysia such as Melaka and Penang. These places were historically part of the Arabic trade routes during British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia. Historically, South Arabic traders developed trade relations with communities around the Persian Gulf and the Indonesian archipelago. According to Hellman (2013), not only is

the tradition of pilgrimage to the Sufis' holy tombs attaining personal goals, but also mounting resistance and subversion against dominant political and religious leadership in Indonesia.

There was a difference in the way and process of spreading religions because of the influence of local culture, allowing the development of a religion over time. The Qurtuby's study in 2013 shows the diversity in patterns and dynamics of Islamization, transformation, and religious conversion in Java from Hinduism, Buddhism, Animism, and 'Javanism'. This difference also occurred in the history of modern Java where there were socio-political forces supporting Islamization. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the Islamization process took place through Islamic boarding schools or religious schools, and economic structures. During the old order period, Islamization was carried out through the political parties' mobilization, while in the New Order Era it was through school programs and *Da'wah* movements. Qurtuby's (2013) study above also shows that institutions outside of religion; in this case, the state exerted its influence on the development of religion in the country. In the context of Indonesia as a pluralistic country, the interaction between Islamic values as the majority religion and other values becomes a necessity. Religious and secular values are combined to build a nation.

Not only is Indonesia's diversity of religions about quantity or number of religious followers but also the intensity of understanding religion, religious practices, and socialization between generations. In Javanese rural communities, *Abangan* group is represented formal Muslim, but they do not carry out Islamic Shari'a such as five-time prayers, *zakat* (alms), fasting, and Hajj. This *Abangan* group has different characteristics from the *Santri*, or those who practice Islamic Shari'a consistently. This reality is described by Geertz (1963) through his extraordinary work, '*Abangan*, *Santri* and *Priyayi*' groups. The differences in characteristics between the groups reflect differences in understanding of Islamic values, which in turn lead to differences in religious practices. The reality of diversity is also relevant in the context of socialization of religious values among generations. Alimi's study (2018) describes how people in Sulawesi teach religious values through storytelling which is considered to have a broad appeal and can be understood by various levels of society with different levels of doctrinal understanding. Storytelling can even construct *Sharia*, which theoretically becomes a discourse only for people with a certain level of religious knowledge. Thus, storytelling is easier to understand for ordinary people.

The differences in understanding religion in society have negative consequences such as social conflict. The ideological conflict between *Abangan* and *Santri* has been occurring for a long time in rural Java. *Abangan* tends to be

syncretic by combining cultural and Islamic values. The practice of syncretism, for example, is reflected in the *Selametan* ceremony, representing the human life cycle. In the *Selametan* ceremony, it is a combination between Hindu tradition and Islamic prayer using Arabic words cited in a Javanese accent. However, this ceremonial practice is not accepted by *Santri*, who purify Islamic teachings based on Prophet Muhammad's teaching. A study by Sutiyono in 2010 describes the clash of *Abangan* (syncretic) cultures with puritan groups (*Santri*) in rural Java.

Another phenomenon related to the spiritual reality in Indonesia is religious conversion. Religious conversion is inseparable from the state policy on religion. According to Qurtuby (2013), a massive wave of conversion to Islam occurred after the end of the movement of the Indonesian Communist Party. The government during the New Order era obliged every citizen to adhere to one of the official religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Further, Confucianism also became the official religion of the country. Some people were gripped by fear if they did not adhere to one religion, being accused as Communists. This moment was used by Islamic scholars to offer Islam to Buddhist followers in the Besuki area. A study by Duncan in 2003 describes how the Tobelo community in Maluku islands was converted to Christianity peacefully. Other studies such as by Barnes (1995) shows that religious conversion had even taken place in colonial times. In the 17th century, the Lamakera community in Solor was Catholic, but after the Portuguese rebellion, they returned to Islam and allied themselves with the Dutch against the Portuguese. A study by Ali (2007) even shows that religious conversion has been going on since pre-colonial times. Chinese Muslims have been part of Indonesian society since before the Dutch colonialism. After Independence Day in 1945, many migrants and their descendants chose to settle in Indonesia and mingled with the local community. Therefore, there was 'hybrid' Chinese-Indonesian culture, called *Peranakan*. For Chinese people, one way to assimilate into local and national communities was to adopt majority religion, i.e., Islam. Religious conversion can also be through interfaith marriage.

After Indonesian independence, the religious landscape changed into various aspects. These changes include the relationship between the state and religion, the composition of religious demographics, the degree of religion, and religious expression. In terms of the relationship between the state and religion, the ideology of *Pancasila* requires the separation of religion and state in some issues. According to Steenbrink (2011, p. 294), the social role of religion is limited to activities related to personal religious practices such as marriage, religious ceremonies, marriage regulations, divorce, and inheritance law. Religion is not formally involved in political practice. The first precept of

Pancasila, namely the Almighty God reflects the obligation of every citizen to believe in the oneness of God. Practices such as concern for the environment, the poor, economic development, community health, and social harmony, are shared concerns of all religions.

The animist and traditional religions in some regions were not previously recognized as a religion. According to Keyes (1996), some animist groups in Kalimantan and Sulawesi declared their religious beliefs and practices. Eventually, they succeeded in convincing the government so that their religion was officially accepted and recognized. Subsequently, Protestant has also been recognized as an official religion and it is more attractive to peripheral communities who are now actively participating in the national economy. Howell's (2001) study shows that Sufism, which is identical with the traditional rural sector, is still in its existence. The basis of rural, institutional, and classical Sufism, *Pesantren* and *Tarekat* remains intact and even shows signs of steady growth related to the adaptive change in structure, recruitment style, and membership. Ironically, at the top of economic development during the New Order Era, Sufism inspired economic activity in the urban middle class, a class that was most intensely involved in modernization and globalization. Sufism is part of a broader Islamic revival to date, characterized by elements of modern science and technology in religious propaganda texts.

Changes also occur in religious practices. These changes take place due to changes in government policies as well as natural processes concerning the interaction of sociological factors in society. A study by Suada and Gelgel (2018) shows how the tradition of *Masatia* tradition in Hinduism, which was banned by the colonial government in 1908, transformed especially into the hair of *Masatia*. For the Balinese Hindu community, hair is considered the most sacred limb; hair on the head is a crown. As a result, Masatia transformation has involved *Tatwa*, deeds, ceremonies, and *Upakara* (offering tools).

Another significant change in the relationship between religion and gender occurred in the Post-Colonial Era. According to Price (2008), empirically, individuals living in countries with colonial history are less egalitarian from gender ideology. This relationship occurs after controlling the level of development, democracy and the proportion of the Muslim population. Srimulyani's (2007) study shows that the acceptance of female students in Islamic boarding schools is a significant breakthrough in the context of Islamic life in Indonesia. This progress leads to the unique provision of Islamic education which is gender segregated, although its level of practice depends on a leader of *Pesantren*.

The prominent role of women in democratization is also a necessary change in the society. A study by Rinaldo (2014) explains that women can facilitate the manifestation of new agencies that are in line with the challenges of realizing

the development of a more gender-equitable society. Pious Critical Agency (PCA) as a symbol of Islamic revival can attract resources from both religious and secular circles, simultaneously. Leaders of *Fatayat* and *Rahima* from the growing urban middle-class society are well-positioned to take advantage of social and political changes over the past 15 years. They train women in various regions to understand Islam, while they are also campaigning for ideas that safeguard women's rights, equality, and religious pluralism.

5.2 Relationship between Religion and State

The discourse of relations between religion and state covers broad aspects. The aspects cover the philosophical foundation of relations between religion and state, state policies related to official religion, treatment of the state against minority groups/religions, religious affairs which are areas of state regulation, the way the state controls expression religious, and socio-economic impact on the relationship between religion and state—some aspects spark off intense debate. The debate is on the integration or separation of religious institutions from the state. European history before the Renaissance showed a close relationship between religion and the state. Meanwhile, the religious institutions functioned as tools for the political legitimacy of the ruler. However, the conflict relations began to occur when the scientific revolution shook Europe. At that time, new discoveries in the field of science turned out to be contrary to the doctrine of the church. Besides, intimate relations between religion and the state began to be 'disrupted' by the development of the idea of democratization.

Furthermore, the relationship between the state and religion has a broad impact on people's lives because the state has a strategic role in taking specific policies that have broad implications. A study by Fox and Tabory (2008), for example, showed that state support for religion was a structural factor that influences religious pluralism. The World Values Survey and the International Social Survey Program in 81 countries found that state regulation on religion significantly affected religiosity. Similarly, Buckley and Mantilla (2013) also found that religious regulation affected religiosity, with the state having much more capacities. According to Buckley and Mantilla (2013), attributes such as state capacity are highly correlated with the level of government religious regulation. However, if the development process increases state capacity and decreases individual religiosity, development can also have an impact on religious regulation through its impact on individual religiosity. On the other hand, using case studies in Indonesia, Buehler (2013) argues that Islamist

groups are more influential than political parties in influencing policies and the direction of democracy. Previous studies conducted by Langohr (2001) and Freedman (2009) prove that Islamic organizations in Indonesia make a positive contribution to building democracy. Hamayotsu (2002) who conducted a comparative study between Indonesia and Malaysia concluded that ideological character has an impact on national development. Malaysia under the leadership of Mahathir has raised an anti-Western issue to mobilize Malaysian nationalism. The image of Islam that Mahathir wants to create is modern and progressive Islam.

The studies above explain that the relationship between state and religion is complicated. Religion can be an independent variable, but at the same time, religion can be a dependent variable. The complexity of the relationship between the state and religion is confirmed by McGregor (2010). According to McGregor (2010), since the strengthening of the influence of modernization theory in the 1950s, religion occupies a marginal position due to increasing secularism. Religion is considered as something taboo and is outside the development discourse. Through his studies in Aceh, McGregor explored the importance of religion in development by tracking the network of development agencies operating in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami disaster. Reconstruction of sites that were considered sacred had difficulties or obstacles. In this sense, the ethical approach is essential. Thus, for more practical assistance, transnational development networks need to pay attention to local issues and priorities by involving religious institutions rather than continuing to promote the culture of secularism.

The issue of secularism and democracy in the Western world is like two separate entities. There is a widespread assumption that democratization must be secular; therefore there must be a separation between religion and the state. According to Driessen (2010), this assumption, however, has no empirical basis. Using quantitative data from Grim and Finke (2006) and Fox (2006), Driessen (2010) argues that once the preconditions of core autonomy have been fulfilled, the further separation between the church and the state is not always related to the level of democracy of a country. Data shows that religion has a central role in the country's political life with high levels of democracy and freedom. Safitri's study (2010) shows the opposite effect, namely how state policies influence religious life. Some countries were to be sample such as France, Iran, and Indonesia. The result is that there are differences in the policy, for instance, about using headscarves for Muslim women in public spaces. Indonesia takes a neutral path in the use of headscarves for Muslim women, which is different from France, which forbids the practice, and from Iran, which requires women to wear hijab/headscarves.

Some European countries currently face the problem of religious tolerance, which has an impact on the importance of reviewing the relationship between church and the state. The flow of migration from Muslim countries such as Turkey, Asian, and African countries in recent years has become a new phenomenon and complicated problem for European countries. According to Knippenberg (2006), the Netherlands, a very tolerant country and dominated by Calvinist Church, has experienced severe challenges when Muslim migration has had an impact on the rise of schools and mosques in the country. This impact is possible since the structure of state policies on allowing the establishment of schools and mosques is relatively easy. Eventually, the main Protestant church has failed to integrate immigrants in the Netherlands. The phenomenon of global terrorism adds to the issue of relations between religions and the state in the form of a new gap between Muslims and non-Muslims.

According to Henkel (2006), religious landscapes in Germany changed from 1960, when Roman Catholics and Protestant Churches had lost many members, and new religious communities i.e., Turkish migrant workers, arrived. Germany is another example of a tolerant country where state policy allows small churches to coexist with two dominant churches that consider themselves *Volkskirchen*/the people's church. The *Volkskirchen* principle was even introduced to East Germany despite being a minority Christian because of the strong influence of Communism for 40 years. When Muslim immigrants arrived, the country slowly changed its perception to immigrants who need time for migrants to be integrated.

In the Indonesian context, the relationship between religion and the state is on the continuum between separate and religious domination over the state. Indonesia, as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, declares itself not an Islamic state. According to Hosen (2005), Indonesia is also not a secular state, which is characterized by the refusal parliament for secularism which it sees as privatization or decline in the role of religion. The role of religion in public life does not imply that all political institutions are subject to a theocratic system. Based on Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, religion has a role both in the social life of the community and the state. Seo (2012) also stated that the management of religion carried out by Indonesia was different from an Islamic state such as Saudi Arabia or a secular state like Turkey. According to Seo (2012), there are four regulations relating to the state's attitude towards religion, namely the 1965 presidential decree on recognized religion, a joint ministerial decree on the construction of houses of worship in 1969 and 2006, the 1974 marriage law, and the 1978 ministerial decree on preaching activities. During the New Order Era, the government managed the

religion by limiting religious practices, emphasizing more on issues related to aspects of state administration compared to spirituality.

Further, a study by Seo (2013) examined the enactment of the 1974 marriage law, which prohibits interfaith marriage. This limitation shows that the state regulates everyday life such as love or marriage. Different religious couples find it difficult to get married, and the solution is that if one partner does not convert, marriage is legalized abroad. As a result, many couples choose to legalize their marriage in Singapore or Australia, which allows their marriage legally. A solution to convert to religion makes interfaith marriage a means of religious conversion in Indonesia. According to Crouch (2012), a draft marriage interfaith law is being produced as an effort to overcome the debate between Muslims and Christians, as well as in the Muslim community itself. This draft of the law was prepared based on the policies of the minister of religion and the MUI (Indonesian Ulema Council) fatwa. Changes in methods of religious regulation by the state relate to dynamics and debate regarding the source of relations between the government and religious authorities in Indonesia.

Apart from marriage, another special issue that is also a concern for state regulation is sexuality. The primary debate that takes place in the public sphere is same-sex marriage. The debate has shifted directions from time to time. Blackwood (2007) divided it into three periods, namely the New Order Era until the 1990s, the period 1990–1998, and the Reform Era after the end of the Soeharto regime. During the Soeharto regime, Indonesia sought to control sexuality through gender equality. During the 1990s, Islamic discourse on state sexuality shifted in response to international pressure to support sexual rights and same-sex marriage. Then, at the end of the Soeharto regime in 1998, a conservative Islamic minority encouraged new laws governing sexuality and morality. During this period, the dominant discourse on sexuality shifted from normative gender to the idea of heterosexuality and marriage to regulate heterosexual marriage and criminalize various non-heterosexual sexual practices.

The focus of religious regulation by the state is how the state treats minority groups or religions. This aspect is an essential benchmark for the level of religious tolerance. The more discriminatory treatments of the state against minority groups, the higher level of intolerance practices will be taken. Discriminatory treatment can be meted out by state institutions through their policies, organizations, and individuals. The issue of tolerance, however, is complicated in Indonesia where the majority of the population is Muslim. Discriminatory treatment against minority groups comes from differences in understanding the limits of tolerance itself. For some Indonesian Muslims, tolerance is limited to the area of human relations (*muamalat*) and not concerning God (*Tauhid*). For this group, the practice or actions of individuals that

cause potential damage to the relationship between human and God, then it is prohibited (*haram*). Suwarno (2013), for example, identified some actions such as saying Marry Christmas by Muslims to Christians or praying together with other religions is prohibited.

Similarly, the theological foundation is reflected in the actions of the MUI, which rejected the Ahmadiyah (*Ahmadiyya*) Muslim minority. According to Nasir (2014), the rejection originated from the strict interpretation of tolerance given by the MUI. This refusal, however, reflects the MUI's ambiguous attitude towards democracy. On the one hand, the MUI has accepted several principles that are prerequisites for democratic societies and countries, such as equality before the law, good governance, human right protection, maintenance of public peace and security, and participation in fair elections. On the other, the MUI rejects the idea of pluralism.

A study conducted by Muzakki (2010) describes how minority groups experience discrimination, even though the state has issued a policy in the form of a law promoting the spirit of equality. Ethnic Chinese Muslims are a minority group that has suffered a decline in population since the last three decades. Currently, there is only limited space for this minority group to articulate and express their social-political interests and identities. Even though the government issued a new Citizenship Law No. 12/2006, this group continues to experience discrimination. The law constitutionally guarantees equality in terms of citizenship status, but in practice, it does not eliminate the practice of discrimination at all levels of the bureaucracy. Consequently, the group adopted a humanistic approach that is working with faith-based organizations as a defensive mechanism against the possibility of anti-Chinese sentiment and discrimination and exploitation from both the local community and the state bureaucracy. A study by Duncan (2007) shows that regional administrations also take discriminatory actions against minority groups.

Discrimination against minority groups produces different defensive effects and mechanisms among groups. Connolly's (2009) study shows that Dayak tribes are adopting a religious conversion strategy of turning to Christianity to maintain their ethnic identity from the threat of their Muslim neighbors. Anthropological analysis generally describes this common objection to policies requiring conversion. It is different from research findings made by Prasojo (2011) in his study on the minority *Dayak Kebahan* group who maintained their ethno-religious identity as Muslims different from other groups. These two minority groups are often exploited as potential political mobilization resources. The decision to maintain ethno-religious identity is a bargaining strategy because in terms of prosperity level, the group has advantages over other groups. There are at least three reasons for defending themselves: 1) historical, socio-,

and cultural attachments with other Dayak community groups; 2) inheritance identity that connects with the same religious community outside the region; and 3) ease of interaction with non-Muslim groups and Malay Muslim groups that have an impact on strengthening identity double.

A study on minority groups shows that although minority groups have suffered discriminatory treatment from state policies and other groups in the community, each group took a different cultural strategy. Empirically, the dynamics of minority groups is a setting of separatist movements. According to Viartasiwi (2013), the practical level is not much under study. Society is not homogeneous, but surely there are minorities that have different aspirations and historical backgrounds. For example, Papuan Muslim groups have an equal identity with the majority of Indonesia's population, but different from the majority of the Papuan population who are Christian. This group is often marginalized, but their political choices favor the majority of the Papuan population because they emphasize security issues. Gudorf's (2012) study on Pentecost shows that state policies in the form of restrictions on foreign aid, proselytization bans, and permit requirements for the Forum for Religious Harmony/FKUB to build worship has an impact on the development of religion.

State policies and treatment of minority groups are essential as current global issues and, at the same time, these become a benchmark for the maturity of a country's democracy. Empirically, there have been discriminatory actions against minority groups in various countries in various forms with intensity. According to Sarkissian, Fox, and Akbaba (2011), theoretically, there are at least three critical factors why such discriminatory actions occur. Through their studies on predominantly Muslim countries using a dataset of Religion and State-Minorities (RASM), it was found that these three factors are structural, political, and ideological factors. Structural and political factors further explain why a particular minority group is more a target of discrimination than others, while, cultural factors explain why a minority group faces a bigger problem than other groups. Overall in all Muslim countries, there are differences in the level of discrimination.

The following table shows Indonesia's scoring position in terms of religious freedom. The value of religious freedom tends to be high (5/7), which means that the level of religious freedom in Indonesia is relatively low. Other characteristics of the issue include: religions in Indonesia tend to be regulated by the state, social rules tend to be high on religious life, government intervention in religion is relatively moderate, religious majority regulations/restrictions on the whole religion tend to be low, and discrimination against minorities tends to be low.

TABLE 5.1 Restriction on religious freedom scores for Indonesia

No.	Religious freedom indexes	Score
1	Religious Freedom Scale, 1–7 (Low Is More Freedom)	5/7
2	2008 Freedom of Religion, CIRI Human Rights Data Project	severe/widespread government restriction on religious practices
3	GRI: Government Regulation of Religion Index (0–10, Low Is Less Regulation)	6.5/10
4	GFI: Government Favoritism of Religion Index (0–10, Low Is Less Favoritism)	7.6/10
5	SRI: Social Regulation of Religion Index (0–10, Low Is Less Regulation)	9.7/10
6	2002 Religion and State Score (0–100, Lower Is Less Governmental intervention in Religion)	45.22/100
7	2002 Regulation and Restrictions on Majority Religion or All Religion (0–33, Lower Is Less Regulation)	6/33
8	2002 Religious Discrimination against Minorities (0–48, Lower Is Less Discrimination)	14/48

SOURCE: LERNER, 2013

Discriminatory treatment against minority groups in many cases has an impact on the development of radicalism. According to Sirozi (2005), in the Indonesian context, the outbreak of radicalism in the Reform Era was mostly caused by radical groups in the New Order Era that were under pressure. The Reform Era reviving the spirit of freedom is a momentum to consolidate political power, including playing a role in social, political, and religious dynamics. Historically, research by Aspinall (2008) and Galamas (2015) shows that radicalism has existed in Indonesia for a long time. The phenomenon of radicalism from time to time poses a threat to NKRI and *Pancasila* because this movement is contrary to the conditions of pluralism in Indonesia (Sulaiman, 2017). These radical Islamic groups are often subject to repressive actions for carrying on polemics over relations between the state and radical minority groups. Therefore, Hilmy (2013) states that the holistic approach needed in a framework of respecting human rights. This approach suffices from the upstream to

downstream levels. The approach shall involve many stakeholders and adhere to human rights principles.

Sociologically, the phenomenon of radicalism in Indonesia reflects the diversity of the political dynamics of Islam. The political dynamics of Islam are strongly influenced by the relationship between the state and religion (Islam). Woodward (1993) notes that in 1985, the parliament passed the Law on social organization stating that every community organization must be based on a single ideology, i.e., *Pancasila*. This law allows the government to ban organizations that are considered to endanger political and security stability. Through this law, Islamic leaders and modernists are also subject to the provisions not to speak in the area of radical activism. The provision has received reactions from various community organizations such as Muhamaddiyah. Baswedan (2004) argues that the dynamics of political Islamic undergo transformation and diversification. Recent developments show that political Islam is not synonymous with Islamic aspirations as happened in the period of liberal democracy in the 1950s and the beginning of the new order. In that period Islamic politics meant advocating the Islamic agenda. Not only are the politics of Islam represented by Islamic political parties that use the Islamic platform, but also by 'friendly' Islamic political parties. Therefore, there were groups called Islamists, Islam-inclusive, or secular-inclusive. The variety of Islamic groups in Indonesia is reflected in their attitude towards contemporary issues (Daniels, 2007). For example, in addressing the issue of blasphemy in the form of caricature of the prophet Muhammad published in one of the magazines in Denmark, radical Islamic groups took the path of domination as an expression of their understanding of the ideology of *Jihad*. Moderate Islamic groups do not follow such a method. Effendy's (2010) research also shows that not all Indonesian Muslims support the politicization of Islam. Support for ideological and symbolic Islam turned out to be relatively low in Indonesia. A survey conducted by Sakai and Fauzia (2014) also found a tendency that Indonesian Muslims became less Islamist in politics.

Another dynamic of political Islam in Indonesia is the enactment of Sharia law in various regions as a form of democratic development. Through the law on regional autonomy, the application of Sharia laws is possible at the district level. According to Woodward (2001), this phenomenon arises because of the discourse where the implementation of Sharia law, which is developed in the community, is in line with Islamic effort globally. This tendency leads to problems in Indonesia today, namely the negative stigma of Islam due to jihadist movements in the name of Islam. According to Pisani and Buehler (2016), there are at least two motivations for applying Sharia law, namely ideological beliefs on the one hand, and responses to constituent preferences on the other. Dominant motivation can also exert influence on the spirit of law

enforcement. Previously, Buehler (2008) saw that this development is in the context of institutional change. The district administration can obtain the flow of funds from the enactment of the sharia law for political consolidation. This action is needed to deal with the new political dynamics in which candidates for regional heads/leaders must contest themselves on direct elections. This direct election system requires significant political sources and capital. The negative implication of implementing Sharia law was also identified by Fanani (2011), where many religious minority groups were forced to follow the law. Sharia law has also caused discrimination against religious minorities. Another problem that arises from the application of this law is, as stated by Siregar (2008), in the form of judicial institutional competence in dealing with Sharia criminal law, especially in the Province of Special Region of Aceh (DI Aceh).

Besides implementing *Sharia* law partially, there is also sharia law implemented nationally in Indonesia, namely in the banking sector, that is Islamic banking. The development of the Islamic bank has a more noticeable impact on society. Since 1992, Indonesia has moved towards the development of Islamic economics and financial institutions with the development of Islamic banking. According to Abduh & Omar (2012), Islamic banking has made its contribution to the improvement of national economic performance. More specifically, Adnan and Ajija (2015) studied that Islamic banking has proven to be effective in reducing poverty. In line with the study by Fianto et al. (2018), micro-credit Islamic financial institutions have a positive impact on increasing rural household incomes.

The application of Sharia law in both the economics and other aspects is a strong indication of Islamic revivalism in Indonesia. Other evidence that can be shown is the increasing role of Islamic political parties and the role of women in humanity and the political arena at the regional and national levels. According to Hasan (2009), the main factor that drives Islamic revivalism is the growth of the Muslim middle class and networks allowing the wider community's involvement through this network, the message of Islamic revival has resonated violently, affecting various social and political fields. According to Latief (2013), the increase in the role of political parties was shown by the involvement of several political parties in social welfare activities through the Islamic charitable organizations they established. This charity practice is a popular way used by politicians to protect their constituents, but at the same time, this practice has weakened the Muslim perspective on social development and change. A study by Rinaldo (2018) shows how women party activists, in the case of Prosperous Justice Party/PKS, show their habitus of piety through their habit in dressing up and marriage. This habit, however, is only one of the Islamic habitus that competes in Indonesia.

According to Sakai (2012), the development of faith-based organizations in Indonesia contradicts the secularization process and the modernization theory. The religious-based organization expands its services outside the education and health sectors, namely by offering disaster relief and poverty reduction programs that have yet to be entirely run by the government. Even so, the state considers such organizations as a threat. The Indonesian government would like to be the primary social service provider. Therefore, the policy issued has the effect of a logistical challenge for the survival of such organizations in the future. Besides, theological differences across religious groups have made it challenging to form inclusive partnerships between organizations. This socio-political context limits the formation of effective partnerships to offer coordinated social services. The issue of coordination between the government and social organizations that provide social services was also found by Halimatusa'diyah (2015) in her study on the role of zakat institutions in alleviating poverty in Indonesia.

The rise of Islam in Indonesia correlates with the increasing involvement of women in civil society. Muslim women's organizations play an essential role in the development of the nation-state of Indonesia. Muslim women's groups are incubators for a variety of women's political activism. The increasing role of Islam in the public sphere has also markedly increased the role of women in national debates such as the problems of Sharia law, abortion, and pornography. Such public space debates have a significant impact on the relationship between religion and the state (Rinaldo, 2008). Through a case study on the 'polygamy debate', Wichelen (2009) shows that contestation between women's groups cannot be reduced to the issues of Islam and gender due to their perspective on polygamy intersects with a political identity which is informed through postcolonial, modernity, religion, nationality, and globalization.

Fattore, Scotto, and Sitasari (2010) expressly refute the general assumption that Islam does not support gender equality and democratization. The increase in the number of women who are members of parliament in Indonesia proves that democracy is growing in a country that is predominantly Muslim. Community attitudes towards gender equality are not rooted in their culture or beliefs. Meanwhile, Parker's (2011) analysis shows that culture and religion are not separate and unchanging. Muslim women involved in the movement in Indonesia utilize Islam to build multicultural discourse. Religion is a cultural aspect and something that is potentially personal. There is overlap with culture; both religion and culture are essential sources of identity for individuals and groups. Both can be used selectively as resources by and for women; therefore, religion and culture must be considered as historically dependent.

According to Trihartono and Viartasiwi (2015), strengthening this civil society further contributes to maintaining peace, especially in breaking the cycle of violence. Their study shows how the role of non-state actors in supporting the creation of sustainable peace. Civil society is at the forefront of developing community security. Besides, Bagus (2010) shows that Muslim women do not dominate the role of civil society. In Bali, after the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, there is the *Ajeg* Bali (Bali standing strong) movement; it is a movement to seek and maintain socio-religious traditions based on local culture.

5.3 Religion-Based Social Conflict

Religion-based violence in Indonesia is one type of social conflicts that have existed for a long time. This social conflict cannot be separated from the increasing understanding of radicalism and fundamentalism in society. According to Hamdi (2012), violence in the name of religion has occurred for decades, but the escalation of religious violence in Indonesia has increased sharply after 1998 political reform along with the strengthening of the radical Islamic movement. Religious conflict covers various types. Muqoyyiddin (2012) divided the religious conflict into three patterns, namely: the conflict between different religions, conflicts between one religious community and groups labeled as heretics, and internal-religious conflicts of one religion because of different religious understanding. Meanwhile, Thohir (2010) divides the religious conflict into five categories as listed in Table 5.2:

TABLE 5.2 Taxonomy of religious conflict in Indonesia

No	Category	Actors	Issues
1	Internal—one sect	One sect but different political stands	Different political views and interests
2	Cross sect in one religion	Sunni followers and Ahmadiyah followers	Group claimed
3	Cross religion	Muslim with Christian	Religious building, power and political interests
4	Religion and beliefs	Puritan Muslim versus Local or Abangan	Polytheism; deviation religion
5	Religion and state	Extremist groups	Fundamentalism and extremism

SOURCE: THOHIR, 2010

In the context of a wider conflict, religious conflict is one type of social conflict in Indonesia. In this case, Aspinall (2008) divided conflicts into five categories: firstly, separatist conflicts such as those that occurred in Aceh, East Timor, and Papua; secondly, urban riots, especially those that occurred in a number of cities in Java in 1995–1998; thirdly, the ethnic cleansing that occurred from 1997 to 2001, especially in Kalimantan where Madurese ethnic groups were targeted. The last two categories are religious conflicts and terrorism by radical groups to target and attack Christians and foreigners.

Many factors are causing social conflict in Indonesia. Ostby et al. (2011) found that provinces with high population growth rates and levels of inequality between religious groups are correlated with the risk of violence. Meanwhile, Pierskalla and Sacks (2016) consider the direct election of the regional leaders and factors of access to public services correlate with violence. Previous studies conducted by van der Kroef (1955) concluded that the factor of public distrust towards Western civilization represented by Dutch colonizers was the cause of contemporary conflict in Indonesia. Van Liere (2009) argues that three factors are leading to social conflict in Indonesia, namely: historical memories of anti-colonial struggles, maneuvers of political elites, and globalization. Meanwhile, de Jonge and Nooteboom (2006) consider four factors causing conflict, namely: ethnic composition of the population, cultural attitudes, access to natural resources, and political competition. Other factors are the quality of governance and conflict mitigation capabilities (Brinkerhorf, 2011).

Some cases of religious conflict occur due to fanaticism towards the flow of religion or belief and efforts to make truth claims. A study conducted by Hamdi (2012) on the *Sunni-Shiite* conflict in Sampang, Madura, shows that the religious conflict is essentially a conflict to fight for the basis of the authority of the religious leaders. The *Sunni* or Nahdatul Ulama clerics are the superordinate groups who have enjoyed their position as religious leaders because of the recognition of *Sunni* values as legitimate shared religious values. As the ruling class, they try to maintain the status quo. The hatred spread by declaring the *Shiite* as a heretical group is an attempt to delegitimize the *Shiite* in order to idealize the values of the ruling class. Still recognizing the religious values of the ruling class by itself is the recognition of the leadership of the group. Judging the *Shiite* as heretical teachings and expelling them is an attempt by the ruling class to maintain its leadership authority over the community. Meanwhile, a study conducted by Fajarani (2014) explored that NU and Muhammadiyah residents in Tangerang showed the issue of conflict revolving around the area of religion, religious celebrations, religious rites, and different episteme systems. Conflict occurs because of negative stigma, misunderstanding, and also the closure of each group.

The difference in beliefs and truth is not the only factor in the occurrence of religious conflicts. There is an intersection with other factors such as economics and politics and religion causing conflict. The results of a study conducted by Jati (2013) on the conflict in Maluku between 1999 and 2002 showed that the conflict occurred as a consequence of the injustice and marginalization of certain groups for years. The religious factor is claimed as the main factor in some literature analyses for the conflict in Maluku. However, the case of conflict in Maluku was caused by the struggle for political, economic, and bureaucratic factors. The history of the Maluku conflict was indeed maintained by the practices of domination and subordination from the Kingdom Era in Maluku until the Era of the Republic of Indonesia causing the growing potential of possible conflict.

The results of the study confirm the argument of Cassanova (2001, p. 47) stating that conflict among religious communities cannot only be seen from religious conflicts, but also triggering factors, such as political, economic, social, and power motives. It means that religion cannot be separated from public issues in Indonesia related to political, economic, cultural, and social systems. Religion might become a problem when it faces the issue of secularization inherited in public and private space.

Other factors causing religious conflict include: erroneous understanding of religious teachings and chauvinistic attitudes (Jati, 2013; Liliweri, 2005), overcrowding of local religious institutions (de Juan, Pierskalla, & Vüllers, 2015), anti-resolution of *Shiite* (Formichi, 2014), restrictions on freedom of belief for non-orthodox minorities (Lindsey & Butt, 2016), repressive-antagonistic state policies on radical groups (Hilmy, 2015), the role of the government and political elites that are not optimal and lack of communication strategies between groups (Susanto, 2017), and curriculum and teaching methods for religious education only emphasizing cognitive-psychomotor aspects far from religious values with transformative-inclusive. This kind of education model will only produce outputs of ritual piety, magical and naive awareness. This education model does not have a sense of humanity (Mansur, 2015), social and political dynamics in the context of politicized religion, fragmented religious authority, and state power (Hamayotsu, 2014). According to Liliweri (2005), religious people or specific religious groups tend to have a misleading understanding on religious people or other religious groups, who have different ideological backgrounds affecting the way of thinking, behaving, and acting differently than they.

The development of fundamentalism and radicalism in society is a threat and challenge to the integration of the nation in the context of multicultural societies such as Indonesia. Currently, the notion of radicalism, especially

Islam, has developed in some Indonesian people. According to Mubarak (2015), the inherent characteristics of radical Islam are exclusive and legitimate of the use of violence. This attitude grows from an understanding of the Qur'an and Hadith literally and scripturally which leads to fanatical, exclusive, and 'black-and-white' understanding (Mufid, 2016). The country's response in the form of repressive antagonistic policies towards these groups increases escalation of violence. According to Hilmy (2015), this kind of policy contradicts the development of democracy since radical groups can use a momentum to consolidate and disseminate the ideology of radicalism among the wider community.

According to Mahfud et al. (2018), the historical roots of terrorism and religious radicalism, globally, are inseparable from the social, political, and economic landscapes. Hadiz (2008) argues that Islam has been politicized from the beginning of the twentieth century in the context of anti-colonialism. Furthermore, the class-based distribution movement was then destroyed under the burden of the post-colonial authoritarian regime during the cold war. In the Indonesian context, Schulze's study (2002) identified the main factors namely the inability of the government to manage violence. *Laskar Jihad* poses a security threat because it has been allowed to maintain the existence of illegal paramilitaries, carries out religious cleansing wars, declares *Sharia* law, and imposes a late penalty following its provisions, regardless of the state justice system and contrary to the Indonesian constitution. Other factors identified by researchers in this regard include political repression of the ruling regime, deprivation of socio-economic resources, globalization, and support from abroad (Muzakki, 2014). The development of fundamentalism and radicalism in Indonesia, especially in the Reform Era, has to do with various variables as the causes such as exclusivity of dominant religious identity (Ibrahim, Wulansari, & Hidayat, 2018), perception of social injustice (Alamsyah & Hadiz, 2016), holding low belief in establishing peacefully Islam, and high rationalization of violent attacks (Putra & Sukabdi, 2014), and economic distress (Chen, 2009).

The development of radicalism in Indonesia has encouraged community elements to play a role in de-radicalization. According to Nurdin (2005), the existence of Liberal Islam Network/JIL is highly strategic in promoting democratic Indonesian civil society, while opposing radical group arguments. Sumpter (2017) views civil society organizations as a better level of trust in the community help effectively deal with conflict. Researchers put forward some recommendations to overcome religious conflicts. They include building commitment to togetherness and supporting for religious leaders, mediating parties in conflict, disseminating universal religious values and local wisdom in order to maintain harmony, and holding open and honest dialogue for respecting

heterogeneity (Arifinsyah, 2015), conflict mapping (Suratman, 2017), *talifusö*/*talifus*, or the bond of brotherhood that maintains the solidarity between the local and the migrant communities (Rahayu, 2017). Recommendations also include the use of the internet as a propaganda media (Arifudin, 2016), integrated curriculum and useful methodological approaches in boarding schools (Sari, 2016), perspectives between religious groups (Ariyanto, 2008), cultural approaches to reconciliation (Duncan, 2016), innovative approaches to education at the grassroots level that combine Islamic principles of environmental protection with traditional conservation methods (Mangunjaya & McKay, 2012), and multicultural education (Nakaya, 2018).

5.4 Context of Current Religion: Internet Role and Social Media

Religious landscapes in various parts of the world have been revolutionarily changing because of the advance in information technology. In the context of globalization, mainly, the advancement of information technology is like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, religious teachings and values can experience massive dissemination. On the other, there are also religion-based conflicts due to the dissemination of information through Internet media. Various studies show multi-dimensional changes in religious institutions as a direct consequence of the development of the Internet. These changes include politicization of religion that threatens democracy (Herdiansyah et al., 2018), dissemination of ideology or understanding of terrorism (Affan, 2018), dissemination of religious propaganda (Epafras, 2016; Nisa, 2018; Ridwan, 2015), constructing religious group identity (Bräuchler, 2004), and appealing opinions/strengthening student political movements (Kuniawan & Rye, 2014; Weng, 2018).

Today, the Internet is inseparable from people's lives. According to Kompas.com, current Internet users in Indonesia are around 143 million, or 50% of the total population, and about 74% of them are urban society (https://tekno.kompas.com/read/2018/02/22/16453177/). Wider Internet users followed by the development of social media have an impact on various aspects of human life, including religious institutions. According to Iqbal (2016), the development of Internet users for religious purposes is a process of online religious migration as a strategic adaptation and an effort to strengthen the position of religion in a changing environment. The emergence of online-based religion is a counter-effort to predict supporters of secular theory who claim that religion broadcasted through the Internet does not have a significant impact on the real world in both religious organizations and collective identities of

their religion. Bulliet (2003) calls this phenomenon a 'media revolution', where the religious community throughout the world has a personal communication tool enabling dissemination of information more quickly to the public. Theoretically, this development allows the unification of religious people. In the Islamic context, after 14 centuries of decentralization, Muslim communities have a new future with more significant efforts that can be made with technological assistance to disseminate and enforce similar understanding of faith.

The most prominent use of the Internet, in this case, is to support activities for *da'wah*. According to Ridwan (2015), the Internet is a medium for propaganda to spread more peaceful religious information. Online *da'wah* has the role of initiating peace and non-violent practice in day-to-day life. A study conducted by Arifudin (2016) concluded that the Internet is an efficient contemporary medium in dealing with global challenges faced by Muslims such as Islamophobia, extremism, terrorism, and the issue of gender equality. These challenges provide opportunities for *Da'i* to improve the situation through many forms of Internet preaching. This medium provides a better understanding of Islam in society. Similarly, Nisa (2018) found that Instagram is currently the Indonesian Muslim youth platform. The various messages uploaded on Instagram through posting and captions have a positive effect on understanding the religion and accentuating the identity of piety and the purpose of life among young people. In turn, the role of young people can influence social media through both soft and lucrative relationships through business.

Besides, the use of the Internet allows the creativity of young people, resulting in the acculturation of culture. Anthropological studies by Naafs and White (2012) show how young people connect themselves with trends in global popular culture while drawing inspiration from the latest developments in the local culture, especially in several large cities in Java. Nisa's (2013) study found that several women wanted the purity of Islam by trying to popularize the veil (face-veiled women) through the Internet. This group seeks to create and maintain subcultures through *Salafi* women's groups and a virtual business enterprise. Anantatama and Eriyanto (2018) explain how headscarves were initially less fashionable in Southeast Asia whose citizens are Muslim. When headscarves become prevalent, it benefits the clothing industry even though it has the effect of losing the meaning of the hijab as part of religious teachings. Other studies show how internet usage has an impact on religious knowledge, attitudes and behaviors such as the shaping of public opinion about particular issues (Benzehaf, 2017), consumption of halal cosmetic products (Briliana & Mursito, 2017), consuming halal food (Ismoyowati, 2015), halal tourism (Vargas-Sánchez & Moral-Moral, 2018), recitation of the Koran in the One Day One Juz

community (Muslim, 2017), the technique of memorizing the Qur'an (Dhahir, 2017), long distance counseling (Ardi, Putra, and Ifdil, 2017), *sirri* marriage (unregistered marriage) (Aziz, 2018), the formation of religion-based social groups in diaspora (Wardana, 2014), reinterpretation of sacred texts of Islam such as pregnancy and parenting, maternal death, abortion, sexual relations and HIV-AIDS among students in Java and Madura (Suminar & Trisyoni, 2012), marriage attitude of Indonesian singles (Himawan, 2017), and youth sexuality (Holzner & Utomo, 2004).

Other religions also use the Internet as a medium of propaganda. According to Hutchings (2015, pp. 3811–3830), through digital media, Christian leaders spread their messages throughout the world and multiply their influence. Missionaries can find new ways to preach even in dangerous areas. The boundaries between the pastor and the congregation can be renegotiated. A study conducted by Eprafas (2016), for example, shows how Pentecostal Christians use the Internet as a medium to spread their religious teachings, especially among young people. The commodification of human experience through the media produces a new dimension of understanding the religion and religious pluralism in the millennial (Eprafas, 2016). The discourse of religious plurality and interreligious relations are framed in packages that are not merely formalities but are manifested in real social involvement. Social media is a means for the millennial to hone their sensitivity to religious and social issues. This phenomenon has become a religious experience that is more suited to the culture of young people and is another alternative form of religiosity placing excellence on social affirmations.

The Internet is also a popular media used by certain religious groups both in disseminating their teachings and in expressing their group identity. A study conducted by Makhasin (2016), for example, shows how the Naqshbandi-Haqqani school, which is one of the Sufi groups, is actively involved in the propaganda of its teachings to the general public through the Internet. Propaganda is a response to the influence of political Sufism and Islamism, which is getting bigger among Indonesian Muslims. This propaganda represents the face of Sufism and contemporary Sufi activism in Indonesia. This propaganda has an essential role in raising new Islamic awareness with a greater appreciation of the Sufi tradition among Indonesian Muslims. Sufism has contributed not only to form the discourse or religious morality of society and Islamic consumption patterns among the urban middle class, but also to maintain the peaceful Islam and moderate Indonesian Islam. Bräuchler (2004) also shows how Islamism in Indonesia is transferred to cyberspace by Laskar Jihad in Maluku. Through the Internet, this group develops an identity that was in line with the offline philosophy, but it is extended in the coverage—meaning that online level is connected with offline level.

Meanwhile, a study conducted by Ida (2016) shows how *Shiite* groups express their existence and hide their robes through the Internet. This effort turned out to later get a response of anti-*Shiite* in the form of online publications so that there was a debate about sectarian issues in the past three years in Indonesia. According to Lim (2017), the development of sectarian issues on social media is possible because social media encourages users to practice freedom of speech while silencing others. Through social media, users have the freedom to hate those who are considered opponents. In turn, the polarization of these political groups forms tribal nationalism.

Through social media, certain religious groups that have political interests find effective ways to succeed in their political agendas. Herdiansyah, Husin, & Hendra (2018) show how social media has become a contested space for Islamic organizations and groups to show their political position in front of the government. The closer organization to the axis of power causes the stronger tendency of the organization to articulate the interests of the government. In contrast, opposing groups make social media as a tool to delegitimize government power. Social media can also be used to strengthen the discourse of politicizing religion, which has the potential to contradict the ongoing democratization process. Meanwhile, ownership of an excellent international network variable is a determinant of the success of an organization in utilizing the Internet in its activities (Kurniawan & Rye, 2014).

The role of the Internet in mobilizing political movements in various parts of the world cannot be doubted. The Arab Spring is clear evidence of the fall of totalitarian regimes in various countries in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula because of the use of the Internet in political movements. In different scales and cases, these phenomena also occur in Indonesia. Political movements being developed in the community use the Internet as the basis for the formation of public opinion and mass mobilization. Until now, the Internet was used by students for their political movements. Communities become aware of internet-based political activities. Internet progress in Indonesia has an impact on behavioral change of young people. Weng's study (2018) noted that the use of social media is vital to shape public opinion and to urge Muslims to protest; for instance, it was also utilized by Felix Siauw. Lim (2013) identified the main factors that caused populist political activism through internet media to be able to embrace young people, namely the use of contemporary consumption culture principles, namely the light package, headline appetite, and trailer vision. Social media activism is more likely to succeed in mobilizing mass support when the narrative is simple, related to low-risk actions and following dominant meta-narratives, such as nationalism and religiosity.

The ideas of radicalism and terrorism also spread through the Internet. According to Affan (2018), the Islamic State (IS) group spread terrorism through online magazines in Indonesia. This effort is a threat to Indonesian millennials who actively use the Internet every day. In this way, IS seeks to influence Indonesian millennial Muslims to become their representatives in carrying out independent Islamic operations. Thus, the threat of terrorism throughout the world has also evolved from the asymmetric war to proxy war, especially for millennial Muslims. Today, extremist groups are taking advantage of religious marketing for self-sacrifice (Dorbala et al., 2018). They create confusion by manipulating verses and brainwashing. The main target of the spread of radicalism is a student in which there is academic freedom (Maskur, 2018). Theoretically, the development of radicalism among young people has at least two explanations, namely theological factors and composite social, political and economic variables making young people desperate with their future (Afriyanti, 2012). The prevalence of mental health problems among students in Indonesia is growing, and most are not handled because of the high costs, stigma, and limited service to overcome mental health problems (Rahmadiana et al., 2019).

The presence of digital media in society is not always positive. On the other hand, media have the potential to endanger both aspects of security and order and the development of democracy. Dewi and Aminulloh (2016) identified two types of fanaticism that are developed in social media, namely political and religious fanaticism. Both endanger the life of democracy because they do not want differences as the principle of democracy. Meanwhile, Arofah (2018) found that the utterance of hate in cyberspace is one example of this dangerous situation. Hate speech comes from content posted on websites such as opinions and online political news. Most hate speeches ignore aspects of the ethos that provide a source of credibility and trust. From the aspect of *pathos*, news writers tend to choose words that trigger anger and negative emotions of their readers. While from the *logos* aspect, some hate speech encourages conclusions due to logical errors and claims made. The rhetoric of hate speech ignores the aspects of *ethos* and *logos*, and mostly depends on the tendency of the *pathos* to persuade readers to hate. A study conducted by Kadir and Maufur (2011) found that religious communities have similar concerns about the impact of globalization, but their responses tend to sharpen the problems caused by globalization, rather than providing solutions. This response is probably related to the low level of media literacy among the urban middle class as found by Arifin (2017).

Through social media, volunteers have dedicated themselves to counter the spread of radicalism and Islamic violence. According to Schmidt (2018),

volunteers who fight radicalism on social media use memes, hashtags, comics, and videos as their weapons of choice. The authority of traditional religious leaders has been transformed into a national defense against radicalism; another media resistance to radicalism is online media (Rahman, 2017). Online media contextualizes the interpretation of jihad through the mainstream of Indonesia's majority moderate Muslims. Amalia's (2013) study shows how multicultural education that is used as a compulsory subject in school is part of the response to various problems in society, especially religion-based violence. Such education contains basic principles such as democracy, humanism, and pluralism or inclusive religious values. In general, Internet users in Indonesia have great potential to fight radicalization and counter-terrorism in cyberspace, even though they still face various challenges (Lubis, 2017).

The increase in political radicalization in recent times has become a severe problem for the nation. Religious intolerance is suspected to be one of the causes of various acts of religion-based violence in the regions in Indonesia. According to Hamayotsu (2013), there are at least two explanations for this. First, liberals take advantage of the unlimited freedom of media and the expression of alternative religious visions, but they have limited access to traditional political and religious institutions and resources to influence state policy regarding religious affairs. Also, their religious interpretations and visions of society are seen as too secular and close to Western interests; therefore, it is a distance away to most Muslim communities. Second, the emergence of conservative religious politicians in the country has contributed to the decline of tolerance and religious freedom. Meanwhile, Islamic conservatism and radicalization in post-1998 Indonesia cannot recognize minority rights as a cause of religious intolerance (Sarhindi, 2017).

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