

# The Urgency of Starting Condition in the Religious De-radicalization Policy Collaboration on the Pesantren Perspective in Lampung Province

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**Abstract**—*Starting condition* is one of key factors in determining the success of the policy collaboration, through the indicators of power or resource balance, incentive types, trust between collaborators, and pre-history of collaborators. The objective of this research was to provide recommendation concerning how and in what form of starting condition that should be realized in efforts of building religious de-radicalization policy model. This was a descriptive research by using inductive approach. Data were collected by in-depth interview, observation and library research. Data were analyzed qualitatively by reduction, presentation, and conclusion drawing steps. The perspective of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) was selected because the government so far only positioned *pesantren* as the object of policy so that the relation model built between the government and *pesantren* was instructive pattern. Factually, this relationship pattern provided less positive effect to religious de-radicalization policy efficacy, especially in Lampung province. Research results showed that four basic elements of *starting condition* in commencing religious de-radicalization policy collaboration process could be realized by some methods. Injury in form of power or resource imbalance, not wholeheartedly participation, distrust between actors, and conflicts experienced by collaborators must be avoided. However, this *starting condition* was not sufficient to build *pesantren* based religious de-radicalization policy collaboration model. The institutional design, leadership facilitation, and optimization of collaboration process became other three key factors for building the model and the success of religious de-radicalization policy collaboration.

**Keywords:** *Starting Condition, Religious De-radicalization Policy, Pesantren*

## I. INTRODUCTION

Two serious issues concerning the issue of religion (Islam) and its relation to the integrity of the State of the Republic of Indonesia are (1) the amount of violence (radicalism) in the name of religion, and (2) the strengthening of Islamism which is not only promoting identity as a Muslim, but also the movement of making Islam as a doctrine and ideology so that it was very obsessed with the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia (*khilafah*), directly or indirectly one of which correlated with the perception of the existence of *pesantren*. Why is that? In the first issue, many incidents of violence (such as

bombings) were carried out by people who, if traced, had a relationship or were even alumni of *pesantren*. [1] Even on the second issue, although not directly, the hectic 'individual migration movement' and changes in state form are also strongly influenced by the existence of central figures (*kiai / ustadz / habib*) in *pesantren* (especially modern / charitable *pesantren*).

These two issues, with no doubt, become justifiers for the public to sharply highlight the existence of several *pesantren* after the occurrence of several radical actions in the name of religion. In relation to the government's perception, the threat of terrorism as one of the effects of religious radicalism has become the basis for the government to carry out a strategy in the form of a policy of de-radicalization of religion. The choice of *Pesantren* as an object of the de-radicalization policy is one of the factors caused by the still large assumption that the pattern of education in some *pesantren* in Indonesia has been proven to contribute to the understanding and action of radicalism. Ahmed's [2] study also mentions that one of the problems faced by religious (Islamic) education in Indonesia today is that there is still a pattern of religious (Islamic) education that is too narrow so as to encourage the growth of religious chauvinism.

In Lampung context, data by sindonews [3] showed that Lampung is one of the five provinces in Indonesia that are prone to be a radical base of terrorism. As a part of the territory of Indonesia which has a very large number of *pesantren* and the geographical conditions of the Javanese Sumatra crossing, in reality this province cannot be seen as sterile from the dangers of radicalism-terrorism. It is, as a result, very reasonable when Lampung is becomes one of the priority targets of the religious de-radicalization policy carried out by the Indonesian government.

Technically, the study conducted by Iwan Satriawan, et.all [4] showed that the prevention of radical terrorism by the National Terrorism Mitigation Agency (BNPT) and the Terrorism Mitigation Coordination Forum (FKPT) conducted so far is more on formalistic methods through an interactive dialogue approach in hotels in major cities involving a few community leaders, including *pesantren* delegates. In addition, the guideline for preventing terrorism has also only used formal law, where the element of

obedience is forced from above (top down) rather than awareness from the community and *pesantren* themselves (bottom-up). It is very visible, the dominance of government actors in the policy of religious de-radicalization in Indonesia so that *pesantren* tend to only be the object of policy. In fact, this pattern of relations does not have a positive impact on the effectiveness of the de-radicalization of religion, especially in its implementation in Lampung Province.

In the perspective of state relations with citizens (civil society/group/private organization), these findings have philosophically damaged the paradigm of governance in governance. Therefore, an alternative model of religious de-radicalization is needed by maximizing the existence of *pesantren's* social capital as a subject that is parallel to a more consultative pattern of relations, not just instructive.

In this context, the theory of governance, of which one of the applications is a collaborative governance approach [5], is very relevant as an alternative to build a model of religious de-radicalization policy that further guarantees the achievement of goals. Another argument about the importance of collaborative governance as the basis for building a policy on religious de-radicalization is that as far as the writer has searched, there has never been a study, research or research concerning governance and its relationship with *pesantren* specifically on the topic of religious de-radicalization policies. In this context, this article has novelty value and finds a very high state of the art.

Theoretically, Ansell&Gash [6] asserts that the success or failure of collaborative governance is determined by one of the factors starting as the initial condition before collaborating. Furthermore, They narrowed down on four initial conditions or variables that need to be considered in the starting condition, namely the balance of power or resources from the actors, trust between actors, forms of incentives or encouragement so that actors want to participate and collaborate, as well as pre-history involves experiences of conflict and cooperation that have appeared or experienced by actors in previous collaborations. On that basis, this paper aims to provide recommendations on how and in what form the starting condition can be realized in an effort to build a model of the religious de-radicalization in Lampung province, especially from the perspective of the *pesantren* manager.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

### A. Rationality of Collaborative Governance

There are three arguments in response to the question: can the policy of religious de-radicalization in Indonesia be explored using the perspective of collaborative governance? First, in the development of governance, Keban [7] explains that currently the paradigm of administering governance in Indonesia has reached the paradigm of governance or the fourth phase of the three phases of the development of the previous governance paradigm, the traditional public administration, public management, and new public management. In this connection, involving the community (individuals / groups) in governance and public policy is a necessity. Second, the emergence of government awareness of the limited resources is possessed in the implementation of policies that require it to work with other parties outside

the country. Third, the anticipatory governance of a problem of religious radicalism before the problem grows in the future is another thing that must be done or cannot be negotiated. For these three arguments, the religious de-radicalization in Indonesia is a rational policy to be carried out with a collaborative governance approach.

### B. Starting Conditions dalam Collaborative Governance

Ansell&Gash[6] mention four aspects or variables that need to be considered in the starting condition, namely the balance of power or resources of the actors, trust between actors, forms of incentives or encouragement so that actors want to participate and collaborate, and pre-history regarding the experience of conflict and cooperation or experienced by actors in previous collaborations

First, the aspects of the balance of power or resources will emerge when collaborators have organizational or resource capacity to participate or lack of capacity/resource gaps between collaborators.[8] The relationships between collaborators can be built effectively when each actor has commitment, positive strategy and equal capacity with other collaborators in carrying out the collaboration process.

In the second aspect, equality or alignment between collaborators in the first aspect will affect the level of trust both internally and the level of trust from one collaborator to other collaborators externally. Conversely, when there is an imbalance of power between collaborators it will have an impact on exclusivity among collaborators so that it influences their trust in other actors.

The third aspect of the starting condition is the presence of incentives or incentives that need to be considered from the start before a collaboration forum is formed. These incentives need to be deliberately provided as an effort to encourage participation and form directly (e.g.: money or goods) or incentives in the form of appreciation, pride, and other psychological aspects as directed by Mancur[9].

The last aspect of the starting condition is pre-history in the form of experience of cooperation or conflict from the actors before collaborating. When each actor has previous relations experience, it can be an argument for the success of the next collaboration and minimize the emergence of conflict to collaborate again. Likewise, on the contrary, the experience of conflict previously held by collaborating parties will very likely be repeated in subsequent collaborations so that this pre-history aspect really must be considered.

## III. RESEARCH METHOD

The research method used in this study was a descriptive method with an inductive approach. Data collection was done through in-depth interviews, observations, and literature studies associated with the perspective of *pesantren* in Lampung province as locus. As a limitation, the meaning of perspective is a way of looking at a problem that occurs or a certain point of view used in seeing a phenomenon.[10] The perspective of *pesantren* is chosen because the government, so far, places *pesantren* only in the position of policy objects so that the relationship model that has been built was an instructive pattern from the government to *pesantren* and proved not to provide maximum results in achieving the goal of the policy of de-radicalization of religion.

In this connection, in-depth interviews and observations were conducted at the management of four *pesantrens* representing the typology of *pesantren* as categorized by Sulthon & Khusnuridlo,[12] namely a) *pesantren* that organizes formal education by applying the national curriculum, *pesantren* Al- Hikmah Bandar Lampung, b) *pesantren* that organize religious education in the form of madrasas and teach general sciences even though they do not apply the national curriculum, *pesantren* Miftahul Ulum East Lampung, 3) *pesantren* which only teaches religious sciences, *pesantren* Darussalamah East Lampung, and 4) *pesantrens* which are only a place of recitation, *pesantren* Darussa'adah Bandar Lampung.

After the data collection phase was passed, qualitative data analysis was carried out to produce descriptive data without using numbers. Everything stated by the informant was studied as something intact. In other words, research does not only reveal the truth, but understands the truth. To obtain a level of trust, referring to John W Creswell,[14] a validity test was conducted by triangulating and inviting an external auditor to review the overall results of the research that had been carried out, namely a board of FKPT Lampung province.

#### IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

This section will begin with an overview of how *pesantren* perceive government (state) and government-issued deradicalisation policies. Next, is the evaluation of *pesantren* on their position so far in the policy of de-radicalization of religion, then dominant aspects as obstacles and drivers of the implementation of the policy of de-radicalization of religion. The last is about how and in what form the starting condition is manifested in the collaboration of religious de-radicalization policies.

The focus of the first discussion is the analysis of the second aspect of the starting condition as expressed by Ansell & Gash [13] namely trust between actors. The second focus of the discussion is the first aspect of the starting condition, namely the alignment of the strengths or resources possessed by each actor. The third discussion concerns two other aspects of the starting condition, namely the form of incentives or incentives to collaborate and pre-history of collaborators. The fourth discussion is an incremental model recommendation concerning variations in variables from the starting condition as one of the factors that influence the success of collaborative governance in implementing a policy; in this article, the policy of religious de-radicalization in Indonesia.

##### A. *Pesantren's Perception toward Government (state)*

The importance of a study of perception of *pesantren*, especially where this study was conducted, on the government or state, is supported by at least two reasons. First, collaborative governance as an approach in the governance of religious de-radicalization policies will only work if there is trust from one actor to another. It is important to build this belief that the success of collaboration will only occur if one actor behaves positively (positively) that other actors also have the resources and strength to contribute in collaboration.

In this context, *pesantren* as actors who will be encouraged to be the subject of collaboration (collaborators) must believe in the government (state) as a party to design a policy of de-radicalization of religion. The skepticism of the attitude and views of *pesantren* to the government (state) is the first threat that must be avoided. Second, in the perspective of public policy, only the government (state) has the authority to formulate policies, including the policy of de-radicalization of religion. Theoretically, [15] asserts that the government has the authority or function to regulate in order to represent the public interest. However, the government must negotiate its authority in a collaboration forum so that the principle of alignment between actors can be realized. This part, is the second core of the starting condition, namely trust between actors.[16]

As a vital agent of civil society, [17, pp. 61–64] *pesantren* have become active parties in the formation of the Indonesian state, including four *pesantren* which have become locus of this research. *Pesantren* also include groups that formulate Pancasila as the basis of the state and accept it as a single principle [18]. The involvement of *pesantren* figures in the political arena to date is also evidence of the positive perceptions of *pesantren* towards the government and the state.[19] Moreover, The role of Kyai and *pesantren* in the political arena has been widely played, including in the New Order.[20].

*Pesantren* and the government or state basically have a symbiotic mutualism relationship. The government has provided tangible support for the *pesantren* world, both in its existence and in its operations. The government has provided legal assistance and clear recognition of the existence of *Pesantren* [21]. This form of recognition includes making it an integral educational institution in the national education system.[22] The government provides equality for *pesantren* education from the elementary level to the high education level.

Meanwhile, on the other hand, *pesantren* have contributed greatly to the government and the state, even before the establishment of the State of Indonesia, *pesantren* had become a place of education for the people who gave birth to figures who participated in the birth of the Indonesian state. Historically it has been proven that the big names of *pesantren* leaders from the KH. Hasyim Asy'ari, his son, Wahid Hasyim until the generation of Abdurrahman Wahid has played an important role in the journey of the Indonesian people.[23] Until now, the support and role of *pesantrens* in the government has continued to be given, especially *pesantren* under NU, both of which (NU and *pesantren*) are indeed inseparable integrals [24].

Based on the explanation above, it is very natural, until now the world of *Peantren* can “unite” with the government and collaborate in carrying out their duties and functions, both in the task of educating the nation's life, upholding justice, prospering the community to safeguarding the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. Government programs in tackling the various threats of national unity and the integrity of the state have always involved the world of *pesantren*, including the radical group prevention program through the de-radicalization of religious understanding..

### *B. The Position of Pesantren in the Religious de-radicalization Policy*

A study by Iwan Satriawan, et.all [4] shows that the de-radicalization policy of religion carried out by the government so far (in the form of socialization, counseling, training, facilitation and the like) still leads to the truth of the assumption that deradicalisation policies only make *pesantren* the object of policy. With its sub-system, *pesantren* can actually become agents or main subjects in the effort to prevent and handle radicalism movements in the name of religion being carried out by the government. Therefore, the study of the position of *pesantren* in the policy of religious de-radicalization is important as the first pillar of the starting condition, namely the alignment of the strengths or resources possessed by each actor.

Various researches on the contribution of *pesantren* as one of the civil society organizations to the success of policies and development in general have been expressed by many parties. The *International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development*, Basori&Mukhli[25] for example, found the fact that *pesantren* and other civil society groups have proven to play an important role in reforming the state and intervening capital (market) forces. Reviewed by Harney&Olivia [26] also explains the need for “political space” which is believed to be part of efforts to establish democratic governance so that *pesantren* and other civil society can contribute to the achievement of the goals of governance and public policy.

The pattern of situational relations patterns that can be used by the government to local governments or to community groups as revealed by Hersey & Blanchard[27] The various facts above show that *pesantren* should be placed in the subject position of a policy. As subjects, the position of the *pesantren* is equivalent to the position of the government (state) so that alignment is established or there is no subordinate position between actors. Within this framework, *pesantren* can have space and opportunities to jointly act in collaborating on the de-radicalization of religious policies in Indonesia.

The pattern of situational relations patterns that can be used by the government to local governments or to community groups as revealed by Hersey and Blanchard [27] become the basis for answering the substance in this section. There are four patterns of relationships, namely the pattern of instructive relations, where the role of government is more dominant than the independence of local governments or community groups which are merely the object of policy. The second, the pattern of consultative relations where government interference has begun to diminish because community groups are considered more capable of contributing to policy implementation. Third, in term of the pattern of participatory relations, the role of the government seems to be decreased because regions and community groups have a degree of independence. Fourth, the pattern of delegative relations, where there is no government intervention because community groups are considered to have independently met their own needs.

Interviews and observations to caregivers of four *pesantren* in the study locations absolutely show that other patterns of relations are not only instructive relations patterns, where the role of government is so dominant that *pesantren* are merely used as objects or policy targets

because they are assumed not to have equal government capacity. Another condition is that the implementation of the policy on the religious de-radicalization in *pesantren* was only carried out with formalities by inviting *pesantren* representatives to attend training, outreach, counseling, and the like.

*... for us, the policy of de-radicalizing religion carried out by the government to pesantren is a good endeavor. However, our level of participation is only as a participant or object. We have even been spied on by state intelligence about how the pattern of learning about jihad is taught in this pesantren. But it is okay, since our pesantren has taught wisdom and wisdom for students who have passed wisdom, there is no dictionary of violence in the name of religion in their lives, forever. (KH. Basyarudin Maisir, the principal of pesantren Al-Hikmah Bandar Lampung).*

Even though the sub-ordinate position is not too problematic for *pesantren*, but in the perspective of the first pillar (aspect) of the starting condition, namely the alignment of the strengths or resources possessed by each actor, the results show the opposite. The government is the main controller of the policy because it has the maximum strength and resources, both in the form of authority and in the form of a budget. There is no collaboration at all in relation to the position of the *pesantren* in the implementation of the religious de-radicalization policy so far. The strength and potential of *pesantren* in the form of the dynamics of an organized cottage or dormitory, harmonious *santri* life, teaching of yellow books and classics of high philosophical value, and the *santri*'s respect (*ta'dhim*) to *kiai* and *ustadz* are not considered as capital to build a relationship more than just objects and instructive.

### *C. The Implementation of Religious de-radicalization Policy: Opportunity and Challenges*

The theory of policy implementation by Abidin[28] is comprehensive and realistic and as the analytical basis. The theoretical essence is that the policy implementation process (including the de-radicalization policy of religion) is determined by the support of internal factors and external factors. Elaborative support of policy internal factors includes: (1) the substance of the policy is in the sense that a policy is considered to be of quality if it has good substance goals, assumptions and information.

A goal is said to be good if it can be understood or accepted by common sense and those is desired or meet the interests of many people. Assumptions are said to be good if the assumptions used in the process of policy formulation are realistic or not made up. The information is said to be good if the information used in the policy formulation is quite complete and correct or not expired; (2) resources, including apparatus resources (policy officer implementing support), budget (cost support for implementing policies) and facilities (equipment support and implementation of policies). The support of external factors of policy in an elaborative manner covers the environmental conditions of the policy, concerning social political and economic conditions and community support, namely community support as a target (object) of policies implemented.

In relation to the objectives of the de-radicalization policy of religion, it can be stated that what is expected by the government regarding policy objectives is stated to be good because it can be understood or accepted by common sense from all *pesantrens* even if the goal is desired or meets the interests of many people who understand humanity's meaning or value. All informants agreed that religion (especially Islam) is a source of peace so that matters concerning violence in the name of religion must be eliminated.

*... Islam is a religion of peace so that there should not be any violence on behalf of religion especially to kill other people. We must respect other people's beliefs as we value the fate of differences. If there are santri or pesantren who commit violence, we are convinced that he is not a group of ahlussunnah wal jama'ah pesantren or Nahdlatul Ulama. Therefore, it is not ahlussunnah wal jama'ah or Nahdlatul Ulama if it does not agree with the objectives of the de-radicalization policy of religion that is being carried out by the government (KH. Muhammad Fakhurrizal, the Principal of pesantren Darussa'adah Bandar Lampung).*

In the aspects of assumptions and information as the basis for the formulation of religious de-radicalization policies, *pesantren* caregivers are also perceived as good and current assumptions and information. The assumptions and information used by the government in the process of formulating the policy of religious de-radicalization are very realistic or non-existent in relation to the fact that there is a growing threat of religious radicalism that requires real action in the form of de-radicalization. In the governance perspective, the principle of anticipatory governance is an assumption and information is very fundamental as a factor driving the successful implementation of the policy of de-radicalization of religion.

Support for apparatus resources (support of implementing policy officers in the BNPT forum at the central level as well as FKPT at the regional level), budgets (enormous support for special costs for implementing de-radicalization policies) as well as facilities (equipment support and implementation of religious de-radicalization policies) are also signs from the opportunity that the de-radicalization policy of religion will be more maximal in achieving its objectives if collaborated.

The external driving factor is concerning the environmental conditions of the policy concerning global socio-political and economic conditions as well as community support as a target (object) of policies that are factually implemented strongly confirmed. Externally In the past two decades, radicalism that coincided with terrorism has become a new enemy for the human race, including in Indonesia. Although the roots of radicalism have emerged for a long time, various incidents of violence (such as various bombings against places of worship) have led to speculation from many parties so that tendentiously assume that the rise of terrorism stems from fundamentalism and ideological and religious radicalism, especially Islam.[29] This fact shows that the religious de-radicalization policies in Indonesia externally are in a very supportive policy environment.

Regarding the aspects of the incentive form to encourage actors to collaborate as well as the pre-history

aspects concerning the history of cooperation and conflict from the actors who will collaborate as the third and fourth variables from the starting condition, factual confirmation cannot be found in this research. This is because collaborative governance has not become the choice of approach in implementing the policy of religious de-radicalization in Indonesia, especially related to the active involvement of *pesantren* in it.

#### *D. Strategies to Reach Starting Condition in Religious De-radicalization Policy*

The research findings in the previous three sub-sections show important answers from the most basic level of questioning: has collaborative governance been implemented in the implementation of the current policy of religious de-radicalization in Indonesia? The answer is not yet. The level of the question above is: why hasn't collaborative governance been implemented in the implementation of the policy of de-radicalization of religion? A paradox occurs in answering this question. On the one hand, both internally and externally, the de-radicalization policy of religion shows that there are very large supporting factors in achieving policy objectives. On the other hand, the success rate of the de-radicalization policy regarding the role of the *pesantren* in religion has not shown maximum results. This paradigm brings the answer to the question of why collaborative governance has not been implemented, namely the still large dominance of the government concerning assumptions about the lack of power and resources possessed by *pesantren* in supporting policies and government choices to only use instructive relations patterns.

Therefore, this sub-chapter is built on two questions, namely (1) whether collaborative governance needs to be used to further maximize the success of religious de-radicalization policies? *Pesantren* based religion? The focus on important starting conditions was discussed at the beginning before collaboration was chosen because institutional forms, facilitative leadership, and collaborative processes as three other factors of collaborative governance could only be designed if the starting conditions as a requirement for collaboration had been fulfilled.

First, the policy of religious de-radicalization internally and externally has actually been on the 'right path' to achieve its objectives. However, referring to the popularity of collaborative governance as one of the most recent approaches in building better public policy, all *pesantrens* caregivers in the study locations agreed that argumentative collaborative governance was to be carried out.

*... there are two arguments from the need for collaboration. First, to maximize the results and objectives of the de-radicalization policy in pesantren because we can participate together in carrying out and simultaneously monitoring the implementation of policies. Second, to prove that the four characteristics possessed by pesantren, namely moderate santri, conducive dormitory life system, influence of kiai, and aspects of respects really proved to be able to contribute to negating violence in the name of religion in Indonesia (KH. Dardiri Achmad, the Principal pesantren Darussalamah Lampung Timur).*

Second, developing collaborative governance can be done in various ways. The main step is to ensure that the government 'willingly' reduces the degree of authority and power to be divided into collaboration forums as an implication of the choice to collaborative governance. This step is then called the strategy for starting condition. The establishment of a collaborative forum in a formal forum can be done by developing the current membership of BNPT and FKPT with as much as possible involving the *pesantren* actors in it formally. *Pesantren* and other actors who will be involved in collaboration must be convinced of the fulfillment of three prerequisite aspects, namely (1) having equal strength and resources with other actors so that alignment will be built, (2) from pre-history, *pesantren* and other actors proven have worked together with good results and have never been in conflict so that a high level of trust is built, and (3) there are no forms of incentives agreed upon at the outset as a driver for participating in collaboration. The existence of incentives in the form of material (money or goods) is indeed important, but does not become absolute as a determining factor when all collaborators agree to make the ultimate goal of the policy of de-radicalizing religion as a long-term incentive to be obtained.

#### V. CONCLUSION

Internally, the current goal of the religious de-radicalization policies in Indonesia has proven to have the full support of the *pesantren* regarding goals, assumptions, and information as a basis for policy formulation. Externally, too, the de-radicalization policy of religion in Indonesia has gained space in a global policy environment that all express 'war' against radicalism or violence in the name of religion. However, in its implementation, this policy has not shown any partiality in the running of the principle of collaborative governance as a tool to realize the democratic governance paradigm in Indonesia, especially the involvement of *pesantren* in it.

The still dominant role of the government as the only policy actor seems to deny the potential and strength or resources possessed by *pesantren* in supporting the success of the long-term de-radicalization policy of religion. *Pesantrens* have proved to be only subordinates or objects of the pattern of instructive relationships that have occurred. Because it does not collaborate, there will never be an alignment and level of trust between actors, and there will not be a more inclusive, formal and long-term institutional design.

Although in fact the internal and external de-radicalization policies of religion have been on the 'right track', but referring to the popularity of collaborative governance as one of the most recent approaches in building better public policy, it seems that all agree that argumentative collaborative governance will begin with the involvement of *pesantren* in all its potential and uniqueness more consultatively, it is not merely instructive. Developing true collaborative governance can be done in various ways. The main step is to ensure that the government 'willingly' decreases the degree of authority and power it has to 'share' into an inclusive and equal collaboration forum in terms of membership as an implication of the choice for collaborative governance. This step is then called the strategy for starting condition.

However, the strategy for starting conditions with the fulfillment of the four variables in them is actually only the first step in building collaborative governance. Fulfillment of the starting condition as an opening, the next must be followed by the development of three other factors, namely institutional design factors, facilitative leadership factors, and collaborative process model factors as determinants of how interactions between actors are established in the formed collaboration forum. In the end, the starting condition factor will be the entrance for the next three factors as four prerequisites for the success of collaborative governance in ensuring the implementation of a better religious de-radicalization policy in Indonesia.

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